Home of Britain’s bestselling history magazine and award-winning podcast
A brief history of Memorial Day in the USA
Memorial Day, a day when America honours its war dead, is observed on the last Monday in May each year. In 2023 it will be commemorated on 29 May. Here, historian Peter Caddick-Adams explores the origins of this national holiday, which date back to 1868…
What is the meaning of Memorial Day? The United States has several days on which it recognises members of its armed forces, past and present. This is partly on account of its huge population (roughly 330 million), but also because America acknowledges its veteran community as coming from six uniformed services: the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, Coast Guard and Merchant Marine. Currently, its regular and reserve components total around 0.75 per cent of the population – more than two million men and women. With an average enlistment period of around 15 years, a far larger percentage of the US population have links with serving military or veterans than most other countries. What does America commemorate on Memorial Day? Serving personnel are recognised on Armed Forces Day, observed on the third Saturday of May each year, while former service members are commemorated on Veterans Day, a national holiday which falls on 11 November. The most significant time, when America pauses to reflect on their fallen (also a national holiday), occurs on Memorial Day. What are the origins of Memorial Day? Initially, widespread recognition of American war dead occurred on Decoration Day, initiated in 1868 in the aftermath of the American Civil War (1861–65), and eventually fixed for 30 May every year, the unofficial start of the summer vacation season. The recent graves of the 600,000 who fell in battle were decorated with flags, flowers and wreaths. In turn, this had evolved from unofficial ceremonies that had sprung up in many states, during and after the Civil War, including observance in the old Southern Confederacy. After President Lincoln’s assassination in April 1865, and the subsequent creation of the US National Cemetery System for Union war dead the same year, the formal and nationwide practice of visiting and decorating graves gained popularity. This was further encouraged by guidebooks to the cemeteries, incorporating military history, published by various powerful women’s organisations dedicated to preserving the memory of their kin. Read more | Alternate history: what if Abraham Lincoln hadn't been assassinated? <img src="https://images.immediate.co.uk/production/volatile/sites/7/2020/05/GettyImages-103790613-2fdef7d-e1685451247634.jpg" width="620" height="412" alt="American Red Cross nurses on 1924" title="Commemoration was encouraged by powerful women’s organisations. Pictured, American Red Cross nurses gather at the grave of a fallen colleague on Memorial Day in 1924. (Photo by Authenticated News/Kean Collection/Getty Images)" /> Who founded Memorial Day? Decoration Day was formally inaugurated by the Ohio Congressman (and future 20th president), James A Garfield, who had also served as a major general in the American Civil War. On 30 May 1868 he made a stirring speech at Arlington National Cemetery explaining the purpose of the day and why commemoration was important. “We do not know one promise these men made, one pledge they gave, one word they spoke”, he intoned. “But we do know they summed up and perfected, by one supreme act, the highest virtues of men and citizens. For love of country they accepted death, and thus resolved all doubts, and made immortal their patriotism and their virtue.” Following his speech, 5,000 participants turned out in force to help decorate the graves of the more than 20,000 soldiers buried in the cemetery. Which American city is considered the birthplace of Memorial Day? The term 'Decoration Day' gradually morphed into Memorial Day (a title which itself dated back to 1882), but the name change was only recognised in the 1960s. It was confirmed by the Uniform Monday Holiday Act of 1968, which moved the date from 20 May each year to the last Monday in May, confirming it as a national holiday and making a three-day weekend. The original Decoration Day was in fact a fusing together of several ceremonies held on both sides of the Mason-Dixon Line. Columbus and Jackson, Mississippi; Columbus, Macon and Savannah, Georgia; Charleston, South Carolina; Warrenton and Richmond, Virginia; Boalsburg and Gettysburg, Pennsylvania; and Carbondale, Illinois, all lay claim to being among the earliest originators of the tradition. Some even claim that soldiers’ graves began to be decorated prior to the outbreak of the American Civil War in April 1861. Read more | How Lincoln's 1860 election victory set America on the path to Civil War However, in 1966 President Lyndon B Johnson declared Waterloo, New York, the official birthplace of Memorial Day, since the town had observed the moment continuously for 100 years as an all-inclusive community event, during which businesses closed and residents took time to decorate the graves of the fallen with flowers and flags. By the late 19th century, many communities across the country had begun to celebrate Decoration/Memorial Day, a sober moment later given added impetus by America’s sacrifices made during the two world wars, Korea, Vietnam and elsewhere. Is there any opposition to Memorial Day? Memorial Day is not without its opponents – for two reasons. Some US veterans remain concerned that the meaning of the holiday – to honour the nation’s war dead – has been suffocated by it being included in the first long weekend of the summer. They lobby for a return to the original 30 May date. A second challenge lurks in some parts of the former Confederacy such as Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, and South Carolina, where a Confederate Memorial Day is still observed. This is on variable dates each April or May, in addition to the formal Federal national holiday. What is the Memorial Day flower? Reflecting the wider British, Canadian and Commonwealth practice, it was in 1918 that a Georgian YMCA volunteer, Moina Michael, responded to a poem which spoke of wearing a red poppy as a symbol of remembrance for those who fought in the war. At its conference in 1920, the National American Legion adopted the poppy as its memorial flower. The following year silk and paper red flowers were sold during the week before Memorial Day. Ever since, the American Legion has distributed crepe-paper poppies in exchange for donations around Memorial Day and Veterans Day. Read more | Why we should remember when the paper poppy became a symbol of remembrance Memories of Decoration/Memorial Day have loomed large in American culture, especially in times of war. For example, on 30 May 1944 Sergeant Hyam Haas, a draftee from Brooklyn, found himself driving through Exmouth in southern England on his way to board a D-Day landing craft. “The townsfolk lined the streets and cheered us on – we noticed many of them in tears. It seemed as if the entire nation was in motion. This was the biggest Decoration Day parade ever; the only thing missing were the marching bands. There was constant cheering as we went through towns.” Of course, this wasn’t a Decoration Day festival; the British civilians were cheering the GIs on their way to invade France, but the date was right, and Hyam Haas and his comrades treated it as their Decoration Day. What are Memorial Day traditions? <img src="https://images.immediate.co.uk/production/volatile/sites/7/2020/05/GettyImages-52033542-cd2c94e-e1685451309966.jpg" width="620" height="390" alt="US President Bill Clinton lays a wreath at the Tomb of the Unknowns in 1994" title="US President Bill Clinton lays a wreath at the Tomb of the Unknowns in 1994 during Memorial Day ceremonies at Arlington National Cemetery. (Photo credit should read ROBERT GIROUX/AFP via Getty Images)" /> US Memorial Day traditions around the world vary, but typically include the American flag being hung at half-staff until noon, then raised to the top of the pole. The president usually leads the nation in a wreath-laying ceremony at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Arlington National Cemetery. Illustrating the way Memorial Day Weekend traditions have changed in recent years, in an organised event called Rolling Thunder, thousands of veterans drive into Washington DC on motorcycles. The purpose of their slow procession past the war memorials lining the National Mall is to draw attention not to individual graves, but to the ‘Left Behind’ – that is, US prisoners of war and those Missing in Action. Quiz | American History Trivia Nationally, all Americans are encouraged to pause for a National Moment of Remembrance at 3pm local time. Some wear a red poppy, and most towns and cities across the United States host Memorial Day parades, where bands, veterans and serving personnel march. When I lived in America I noticed that as children grew older they were encouraged to switch their focus away from the three-day Memorial weekend of grilling burgers, heading to a pool or making lemonade. Among my friends, I was pleasantly surprised to find many families actually planned visits to cemeteries and memorials, where the sight of thousands of miniature American flags, one per grave, planted with military precision, is always intensely moving.
Peter Caddick-Adams on genocide and the laws of war
“Even if the possibility seems remote at present, there is no reason to think that the Russian politicians and military figures behind the awful events unfolding on a daily basis in Ukraine will not, one day, be brought to justice,” writes Peter Caddick-Adams
The war in Ukraine has turned very dark in ways few of us expected. Credible reports are pouring in of abuse of civilians, including torture, rape, looting, and executions (which Russia denies). Unlike many recent hostilities, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has been accompanied by Vladimir Putin’s official declaration of war, phrased in the language of a “special military operation”, but warlike in every aspect. The international response has included a call from leading jurists, policymakers, and intellectuals to create a special tribunal to hold top figures in the Putin regime accountable for their crimes of aggression. However, even before the atrocities uncovered in Bucha and elsewhere, Karim Khan, chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), had opened a wide-ranging war crimes investigation. This was in response to a referral by 39 countries, including the United Kingdom. This will be the first time that such a judicial process has opened while the conflict concerned is still in progress. <img src="https://images.immediate.co.uk/production/volatile/sites/7/2022/04/Karim-Khan-ICC-e3e397a.jpg" width="8192" height="5464" alt="Karim Khan, chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), visits a mass grave in Bucha, Ukraine" title="Karim Khan, chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), pictured centre, visits a mass grave in Bucha, on the outskirts of Kyiv, on 13 April 2022, amid Russia's military invasion of Ukraine. (Photo by Fadel Senna/AFP via Getty Images)" /> The ICC, an international body permanently established in The Hague, Netherlands, was established in 1998 and began sittings in 2002. It replaced the ad hoc courts which tried the Second World War aggressors at Nuremberg and Tokyo, and more recent trials against the perpetrators of abuse in Rwanda and Bosnia. In recent years, a total of 46 people have been indicted by the ICC, including individuals from Uganda, Sudan, Kenya, Libya, Ivory Coast, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Read more | Forgotten trials: the other side of Nuremberg How is genocide proven in court? Among the most difficult of charges to prove is ‘genocide’, which has two meanings. One, used by President Zelensky of Ukraine and multiple public figures, is a colloquial description of what is happening in Ukraine today. Politicians and writers have been stumbling over themselves to describe the many violent events in civilian areas of Ukraine as genocide. However, there is also a precise legal definition, which requires proof of the kind that takes years to assemble and test in a court. Dr Iva Vukusic of Utrecht University, an expert on the warring militias of the former Yugoslavia, has observed: “The key thing that sets genocide apart from other international crimes is an intent to destroy, in whole or in part, one of four sectors of a population, whether national, ethnic, racial or religious groups.” The testimony of the victims is not sufficient. A paper trail, voice recordings or similar, are needed to prove that there is a premeditated intention to exterminate a particular group within the wider population. It is “one of the international crimes that has the highest intent threshold,” according to Yasmine Ahmed, UK director of the charity Human Rights Watch (HRW). That is why it is so hard to prove. Read more | Genocide: what can we learn from atrocities in Rwanda, Armenia & beyond? The architect of the term, codified as an international crime by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1948, was Raphael Lemkin (1900–59). He devised the word from genos (Greek: γένος génos, ‘family, clan, tribe, race, stock, kin’) and -cide (Latin: -cīdium, ‘killing’). A polyglot who spoke nine languages, Lemkin was born in what is now modern Belarus and studied at Lviv (then called Lwów) and Heidelberg universities, specialising in international law and foreign languages respectively. Significantly, a posthumous paper of his – Soviet genocide in Ukraine, published posthumously in 2014 – was banned by the Russian Federation as an “extremist publication” the following year. Another student of the international law faculty at Lwów (then called Lemberg, as part of Austria-Hungary), was Hersch Lauterpacht (1897–1960). It was he who inserted the indictment of “crimes against humanity” – murderous acts by a state against individuals, often its own citizens – into the 1945–46 Nuremberg trials. He helped draft many of the speeches of Sir Hartley Shawcross, the chief British prosecutor. These relate to events both in war and peacetime that, as part of a widespread systematic policy by a state, cause large-scale human suffering or death to a civilian population. Unlike war crimes, which can be committed by individuals, crimes against humanity are generally committed by a national organisation, like an army or a police force. How are war crimes defined? A third category of indictments that might be applied to Russian activities in Ukraine are ‘war crimes’. These are activities committed specifically against the series of international treaties and declarations that govern the way war is fought. They were adopted at international peace conferences in 1899, 1907, and 1954, held at the Hague, and became known as the Hague Conventions. They relate solely to acts committed by individuals in war and cover a range of atrocities, including killing civilians or prisoners of war, unnecessarily destroying civilian property, and sexual violence. The 1954 convention relates to the protection of cultural property in armed conflict. War crimes are perhaps the easiest to define, as they run counter to the Hague Conventions just described. Such crimes also contravene the four Conventions and three additional Protocols which complement them, ratified at Geneva at different times, known collectively as the Law of Armed Conflict. The first Geneva Convention was initiated in 1864 by what is now the International Committee for the Red Cross and Red Crescent (ICRC) and today they provide minimum standards of humane treatment and protection to war’s victims. They cover civilians, prisoners of war (POWs), and soldiers who are wounded or otherwise incapable of fighting. Although being charged with either of the above categories, international lawyers observe a sense that the headline-grabbing charge of genocide is ‘the crime of crimes’, though not set in any law as such. Russia-Ukraine war: events in context Russia-Ukraine crisis: 9 milestone moments in history that explain today’s invasion Why has Russia always refused to let Ukraine go? More Russian generals killed in Ukraine than WW2 Nato, Russia, and the history of the post-WW2 tensions Why did America and Russia squander an opportunity for peace in the 1990s? Stalin’s famine: a brief history of the Holodomor in Soviet Ukraine Thus, when President Zelensky accuses Russia of committing a genocide in his country, he might technically be referring to war crimes, and even crimes against humanity, which nevertheless fall short of legal genocide. This is why, when British prime minister Boris Johnson recently stated that the events in Bucha “do not look far short of genocide,” a Downing Street spokesperson then clarified that “the determination of genocide should rightly be made by a competent court, rather than by the UK government”. And although initially cautious, US President Joe Biden on 12 April accused Russian forces of committing acts of genocide in Ukraine. He told journalists: “Yes, I called it genocide because it’s become clearer and clearer that Putin is just trying to wipe out the idea of even being Ukrainian.” When it comes to bringing individuals to trial, with all the difficulties that might ensue in finding and removing someone from the Russian Federation, it is worth remembering that individuals can be tried in absentia. This means they are physically absent during the proceedings. International jurists generally recognise such a situation if the accused is aware of the trial, is in hiding abroad, or if an attorney is assigned to represent them. Martin Bormann, a Nazi official and Hitler’s private secretary, was tried in absentia and convicted of war crimes and crimes against humanity at the Nuremberg trial of 1946. Changes of government and political will were also responsible for bringing the former Serbian president, Slobodan Milošević (who died during his trial); Bosnian Serb Army chief, General Ratko Mladić; and leader of the Bosnian Serbs, Radovan Karadžić, before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). When their crimes were committed, there seemed little likelihood of them ever being brought to justice. Eventually, of 161 indicted individuals from that war, 91 were sentenced. Another option is internal investigations by the Ukrainian national judiciary, who at the time of writing have opened cases on 4,820 incidents of alleged war crimes by Russian forces in the country. By tradition, states have no authority to prosecute sitting heads of state, whereas the ICC can. This is why, even if the possibility seems remote at present, there is no reason to think that the Russian politicians and military figures behind the awful events unfolding on a daily basis will not, one day, be brought to justice. Peter Caddick-Adams is a writer and broadcaster who specialises in military history, defence and security issues. He lectures at universities, military academies and staff colleges around the world and spent 35 years as an officer in the UK Regular and Reserve Forces. His next book, 1945: Victory in the West, is due to be published by Penguin in May 2022
Peter Caddick-Adams on generals killed on the battlefield
“Russian general casualties in Ukraine today are significantly higher – whether seen as a proportion of all Russian generals or as a percentage of the 200,000-strong army they command – than the Allied commitment in 1939–45,” writes historian Peter Caddick-Adams
The world has been agog at the number of Russian generals killed in Ukraine over the last few weeks. This appears to be the tip of the iceberg, for “at least 15 senior Russian commanders have been killed in the field,” according to Markiyan Lubkivsky, a spokesperson for the Ukraine Ministry of Defence. The total was later amended to 16, including five named colonels and four lieutenant colonels. By 27 March 2022, Ukrainian officials said the total number of Russian generals lost in battle was confirmed at seven. Russia has not confirmed this, and the tally has not been independently verified. But the seven Russian generals believed to have been killed include three army commanders: Andrey Kolesnikov, of the 29th Combined Arms Army, killed on 11 March; Andrey Mordvichev, leading the 8th Army, who died in a Ukrainian raid on his command post at Kherson airfield; and Yakov Rezantsev, general of Russia’s 49th Combined Arms Army, killed in another airfield strike, apparently on 25 March. <img src="https://images.immediate.co.uk/production/volatile/sites/7/2022/04/Yakov-Rezantsev-8dfa5cb.jpg" width="4630" height="3087" alt="2H699MF STAVROPOL, RUSSIA - NOVEMBER 14, 2021. Lt Gen Yakov Rezantsev, Commander of Russia's Southern Military District 49th Combined Arms Army (R front), takes an annual international Russian geography test, Geographical Dictation, at the Stavropol Presidential Cadet School. Geographical Dictation has been held annually since 2015 by the Russian Geographical Society to promote the knowlegde of geography and interest in the geography of Russia. Dmitry Akhmadullin/TASS" title="STAVROPOL, RUSSIA - NOVEMBER 14, 2021. Lt Gen Yakov Rezantsev, Commander of Russia's Southern Military District 49th Combined Arms Army (R front), takes an annual international Russian geography test, Geographical Dictation, at the Stavropol Presidential" /> In addition, four other generals are reported killed, according to western sources. On 26 February, Magomed Tushaev, a Chechen major general in Russia’s National Guard (Rosgvardia), died when a column of 56 tanks was attacked near Hostomel (although it should be noted that some Chechen sources dispute his death). Around 1 March, Andrey Sukhovetsky, deputy commander of Russia’s 41st Combined Arms Army, was shot by a sniper. The first week in March saw the death of Vitaly Gerasimov, chief of staff of the 41st Combined Arms Army, outside Kharkiv; while on 15 March, Oleg Mityaev, of the 150th Motor Rifle Division, died as his men stormed the Ukrainian coastal city of Mariupol. There is evidence that some of these generals were targeted by Ukrainian Special Forces, using sophisticated eavesdropping devices. We do not know how many Russian generals are leading troops in Ukraine, but best estimates are that up to 10 Russian armies, each led by a general, supported by a deputy commander and chief of staff, both of whom are also generals, are involved, giving a total of perhaps 30 officers of general rank. At least 12 divisions, led by major generals, have been identified. This suggests a minimum of 42 generals, possibly closer to 50, are directing combat formations in Ukraine. Below them, numerous brigades and now around 100 Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs), commanded by colonels and lieutenant colonels respectively, have been involved. Based on these figures, up to 17 per cent of 42 Russian generals may have been killed. Are these significant losses in themselves, or are senior officer casualties routine in intense combat of the kind we see in Ukraine? War in Ukraine | 9 milestone moments in the history of Russia & Ukraine that explain today’s invasion Generals killed in WW2 The western experience of losing generals during the Second World War was low, for the size of armies involved. America lost four lieutenant generals and nine major-generals during the war, but nine of these were due to accidents, mostly aeroplane crashes. The British and Commonwealth forces lost a similar number – 16 lieutenant and major generals, of whom eight were killed in accidents, again mostly aircraft crashes. In addition, 20 American brigadier-generals and 24 British and Commonwealth brigadiers also died on active service, a striking proportion in accidents. These casualties were sustained while commanding far larger numbers of troops, and spread out over several years of war. Fatal aircraft crashes, which also claimed the lives of Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay, who oversaw D-Day; Battle of Britain commander Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory; and the brother of George VI, Air Commodore HRH Prince George, Duke of Kent, reflect the fact that aircraft were far more primitive and senior figures had to fly frequently over huge distances to command the vast forces at their disposal. In summary, based on what we know, Russian general casualties in Ukraine today are significantly higher – whether seen as a proportion of all Russian generals or as a percentage of the 200,000-strong army they command – than the Allied commitment in 1939–45. Read more | Why has Russia always refused to let Ukraine go? In 1998, author Aleksander Maslov listed 235 Soviet generals killed in combat in his Fallen Soviet Generals, with more than 200 more dying in other ways. They commanded a force that rose from 4.8 million in 1941 to mobilising 29.5 million men and women into the armed services during the course of the war. An equally staggering total of 136 German generals were killed in action or died of wounds during the Second World War. A further 30 died in accidents; 64 took their own lives; and 20 were executed by the Nazis. Both these totals more closely reflect the current Russian model of anxiety to please senior commanders by moving as close to the front as possible – and, in the fatal cases, too close. It was also a German tradition of senior commanders being generally closer to the front, perhaps reflecting poorer communications, but with battlefield knowledge of when to commit reserves. Overall, a striking number of German officers were awarded medals for bravery, rather than command. However, given the size of the German armed forces, which included 315 infantry divisions, each commanded by a general, where a total of 13.6 million volunteers and conscripts passed through its ranks, today’s Russian losses of its leaders are far, far higher by any metric. Read more | How were women treated in Nazi Germany? How many generals were killed in WW1? The conflict where we know most about general officer casualties is the First World War of 1914–18. According to the pioneering work in 1995 of Frank Davies and Graham Maddocks in Bloody Red Tabs, some 232 British and Commonwealth generals, including brigadier generals, became casualties, of whom 78 were killed or died as a result of active service. However, as the duo helpfully identified a total of 1,257 senior commanders who served in the same period [a research project at the University of Birmingham supported their conclusions], this equates to a casualty rate of 18.5 per cent over 51 months of fighting. This is remarkably close to my estimate of Russian general casualties in Ukraine today. Read more | The British generals whose infighting lost the battle of the Somme This staggering statistic means that British generals in the First World War were almost as likely to be killed or wounded as private soldiers. As we do not know how many Russian commanders are involved in Ukraine today, it is impossible to know the same figure, but with a force of 200,000, it cannot be far different. None will compare with the misfortune of US General John Sedgewick in the American Civil War, at the battle of Spotsylvania Courthouse in May 1864. Admonishing a Union soldier for hugging the ground under fire, the general touched him gently with his foot, and said, “Why, my man, I am ashamed of you, dodging that way… They couldn’t hit an elephant at this distance.” Whereupon Sedgewick was immediately felled by a fatal shot. Peter Caddick-Adams is a writer and broadcaster who specialises in military history, defence and security issues. He lectures at universities, military academies and staff colleges around the world and spent 35 years as an officer in the UK Regular and Reserve Forces. His next book, 1945: Victory in the West, is due to be published by Penguin in May 2022 Read next| War crimes history: will Russia be brought to justice?
Peter Caddick-Adams on the history of neutrality and what it would mean for Ukraine
“It will not be enough for Ukraine simply to announce neutrality – as nations like the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Belgium found to their cost in the 20th century, declaring neutrality and it being respected are two different matters,” writes historian Peter Caddick-Adams
Ukraine’s president Volodymyr Zelensky has said his government is prepared to consider adopting a neutral status as part of a peace deal with Russia. But what would neutrality mean for Ukraine, and which other countries in history have adopted a neutral status? Peter Caddick-Adams investigates… The world looks on in horror as the war between Ukraine and Russia continues. Each day takes fresh lives, often of the innocent, unable to defend themselves as their homes are ground to dust. Russia is resorting to destroying infrastructure – schools, hospitals, maternity centres, factories, shopping centres, power stations, television masts – as a way of putting pressure on Kyiv to capitulate. The refugees themselves, their humanitarian aid corridors and online information, have all been ‘weaponised’ to become instruments of terror by the Kremlin. This explains the relentless attrition of all these sectors and people. Moscow’s message is clear: ‘Do as we say, or we’ll make the suffering even worse’. Russian Federation aggression is also directed at the wider world, demanding that it refrain from intervention, and applies further pressure on President Zelensky to cave in. <img src="https://images.immediate.co.uk/production/volatile/sites/7/2022/03/Ukrainian-president-Zelensky-295a91e.jpg" width="1920" height="1080" alt="Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky" title="A screen grab captured from a video showing the Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky speaking about the talks to be held in Turkey between Ukraine and Russia, 28 March 2022. (Photo by Ukrainian Presidency/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images)" /> Zelensky, the actor-turned-president who is playing the role of his life, is a clever man. He has courted and won the hearts of much of the planet but has also put out peace ‘feelers’. One card he has placed on the table is to end Ukraine’s attempts to join Nato (the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) and promise not to seek membership in the future. Instead, he has focused on the greater prize for Kyiv of membership of the 27-nation European Union, which would confer some security benefits but mostly economic ones. Ukraine and the EU On 28 February 2022, Zelensky formally filed for membership of the EU, and on 11 March, after five hours of heated debate, the EU Council voted overwhelmingly to approve the country’s “euro-integration”. It will take years for the future Ukraine, however it looks, to restructure its banks, trade, taxes, and economy, free from corruption and influence of oligarchs, to meet EU needs, for full membership to be approved. However, the process of binding Ukraine closer to the European community, and away from the clutches of Russia, has begun. Read more | Russia-Ukraine crisis: 9 milestone moments in history that explain today’s invasion By being a future member of the EU but not of Nato, Ukraine would join countries such as Cyprus, Austria, Finland, Ireland, Malta, and Sweden. The island of Cyprus is divided between the Greek-supported Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, supported by Turkey. That Cyprus remains two separate entities, each belonging to a different Nato ally (Greece and Turkey), complicates its future admission to the North Atlantic alliance. Meanwhile, Austria, Finland, Ireland, Malta, and Sweden regard themselves as neutral in different ways. As Ukraine’s future trajectory, excepting interference from Russia, seems similar, it is worth examining what neutrality would mean for President Zelensky’s country, and whether it is workable. What does neutrality mean? Neutrality means a country does not ally itself militarily with others. Austria’s neutrality was agreed by the four post-Second World War occupying powers (the Soviet Union, United States, Britain, and France) when they left the country in 1955, as well as by Austria itself. The state is prevented from entry into military alliances or allowing foreign military bases on Austrian territory. Austria maintains national conscription, but as a result of this five-way treaty it spends little on defence and fields only a tiny army. The non-alliance demands came from the Soviet Union, who modelled the Austrian example on neighbouring Switzerland, perhaps the best-known example of a neutral country. Read more | “We missed a precious window”: why did America and Russia squander an opportunity for peace in the 1990s? The Swiss were first considered neutral at the end of the bitter Thirty Years’ War in 1648, reconfirmed at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, when Switzerland’s neutrality was guaranteed by the major powers of the era – Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia. Swiss neutrality comes at a high price, with conscription, active training, constant procurement of up-to-date equipment and a budget of around 1 per cent of GDP, although the nation spent double that during the Cold War. Sweden is the other European country with a long tradition of neutrality. This arose from a military policy of non-alignment in the first half of the 19th century, then formally proclaimed in 1834. Sweden had long been a strong military power in the Baltic, and, like Switzerland, has created the concept of ‘armed neutrality’ to protect its status. Since 1940, Sweden’s security has been dependent on the status of neighbouring Finland, and indirectly on the policy of the Soviet Union and latterly Russia, towards Finland. Of all the wars fought in the past hundred years, that of Ukraine, still in play, seems closest to the 103-day contest between the Soviet Union and Finland. Known as the First Soviet-Finnish War, or the Winter War, it waged from November 1939 to March 1940. Vastly outnumbering their opponents, around one million Soviet troops launched an unprovoked land grab against Finland from several directions. With little happening in western Europe between France and Germany at that moment, newspapers then, as now, made great play of the plucky smaller army skilfully and effectively defending its homeland. Logistical difficulties, poorly equipped Soviet conscripts, as well as Finnish bravery and their maximisation of the use of snipers, caused massive Red Army casualties. However, in February 1940, large-scale artillery bombardments breached the Mannerheim Line, Finland’s southern defensive barrier, and the Soviets broke through. Unable to gain British or French support, Helsinki made peace on 12 March 1940, losing a slice of territory. Read more: What is a Molotov cocktail? <img src="https://images.immediate.co.uk/production/volatile/sites/7/2022/03/Russo-Finnish-War-troops-1940-9398ead.jpg" width="2886" height="3751" alt="Members of the Finnish Army's 'International Brigade' during the war with the Soviet Union, January 1940" title="Members of the Finnish Army's 'International Brigade', stationed on the Northern Finnish Front during the conflict with the Soviet Union, have a warm drink to ward off the cold. Photo dated 2 January 1940. (Photo by Keystone/Getty Images)" /> Finland later, understandably, took the field alongside Nazi Germany against the Soviet Union, and later concluded an Armistice in 1944, which morphed into the Soviet-Finn Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance of 1948. This treaty forbids either side to join a military alliance against the other – Finland cannot not allow its territory to be used for an attack on Russia but is allowed to preserve its neutrality by aggressive defence. Unlike Switzerland, Finland’s neutrality is not protected by international guarantees, but, like Austria, is a case of enforced neutrality, again by Russia and its predecessors. Read more | Why did Britain and France not declare war on the Soviet Union when the Red Army marched on Poland in September 1939? The Budapest Memorandum The present Russia-Ukraine conflict finds its roots in the Budapest Memorandum signed in Hungary on 5 December 1994. In it, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States gave assurances not to threaten military force or economic coercion against Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, in return for those states giving up their nuclear weapons in the chaotic aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The focus was not the protection of Ukraine, but the removal of nuclear warheads from the anarchy of the post-Soviet world, where it was feared they might fall into criminal hands. However, the ‘assurances’ were not the same as internationally recognised ‘guarantees’ – a difference of interpretation which led the western powers not to challenge Russian encroachments into Ukraine until too late. Today, Ukrainian officials insist that security guarantees will need to be much more specific than the 1994 Budapest Memorandum. Ukraine will want to know the precise terms under which countries are prepared to come to its defence in the event of further Russian aggression, writes BBC News diplomatic correspondent Paul Adams. Read more | How have nuclear weapons shaped global politics? 10 key moments in the post-war atomic world What would neutral status mean for Ukraine? Any future neutrality of Ukraine would probably have to rely on an international agreement, such as that which created Swiss or Austrian neutrality, plus aggressive self-defence, as practiced by Sweden and Finland. Outside of Nato, Sweden has just announced a rise in its defence spending from 1.3 per cent of GDP to 2 per cent “as soon as is practically possible”. After a men-only military draft was ended in 2010, mandatory military service was reintroduced from 1 January 2018, with the numbers in uniform set to rise again. The same is true of Sweden’s neighbour, Finland, which has always leant heavily on national service, and where military expenditure has always been significant. Architects will show you the air raid shelters which are mandatory in public buildings of a certain size, which double as sports facilities. However, both Sweden and Finland are now re-evaluating their attitude towards joining Nato, with public opinion in both countries firmly in favour. The February 2022 Russian aggression in Ukraine has triggered a European arms race of a kind not seen since 1914. However, as nations like the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Belgium found to their cost in the 20th century, declaring neutrality and it being respected are two different matters. Nazi Germany stormed into all three in 1940. Thus, it will not be enough for Ukraine simply to announce neutrality. Read more | Why has Russia always refused to let Ukraine go? <img src="https://images.immediate.co.uk/production/volatile/sites/7/2022/03/Hitler-planning-in-Bruly-de-Peche-Belgium--24b75be.jpg" width="3034" height="2075" alt="Adolf Hitler at his headquarters at Bruly-de-Peche, Ardennes, Belgium, 1940" title="Adolf Hitler at his headquarters at Bruly-de-Peche, Ardennes, Belgium, during the campaign of May-June 1940. Left of Hitler is General Alfred Jodl, and on the right is Field Marshal Walther von Brauchitsch, commander-in-chief of the German army. Next to him is Admiral of the Fleet Dr Erich Raeder. (Photo by Hulton Archive/Getty Images)" /> Although Kyiv reintroduced selective conscription in 2014, the year Russia annexed Crimea and attacked the Donbas region, its future reach will have to be wider and its training and equipment thorough and meaningful, in the manner of the Swedes and the Finns. From Europe’s experience elsewhere, a minimum peacetime defence expenditure of 1.5 to 2 per cent of GDP will be required. However, President Zelensky will also be looking for international guarantees, with stronger teeth than those of the failed assurances given in Budapest in 1994. The world has entered a new era, and it is unlikely that Ukraine will be left out in the cold again. Peter Caddick-Adams is a writer and broadcaster who specialises in military history, defence and security issues. He lectures at universities, military academies and staff colleges around the world and spent 35 years as an officer in the UK Regular and Reserve Forces. His next book, 1945: Victory in the West, is due to be published by Penguin in May 2022 Read next| War crimes history: will Russia be brought to justice?
Peter Caddick-Adams on the echoes of history in the Russia-Ukraine war
“The language, tactics, and even the weapons of the Russia-Ukraine war hark back to the 1940s,” writes Peter Caddick-Adams
Spread over 25 acres on a hill overlooking the Dnieper River near the heart of Kyiv in Ukraine is the Museum of the Great Patriotic War. It tells the story of the Soviet Union’s struggle with Nazi Germany. Among the quiet halls, stuffed full of weapons, clothing, equipment, artwork, models, and propaganda, are tanks and guns. Lots of them. And anti-tank obstacles called ‘hedgehogs’. These are lengths of angle-iron, welded or bolted together, which the Germans also put on the Normandy beaches to halt the Allies in 1944. In a bizarre exodus, these Ukrainian hedgehogs have been recalled to duty. Migrating out of their museum and onto the streets of Kyiv, complete with plaques, identifying them as museum exhibits, they have been recycled to do the job for which they were first designed in 1941. All through Ukraine, citizens are digging trenches and filling sandbags, in another mirror to the 1940s. Although the attackers are now the Russians, and some of the defenders’ anti-tank missiles attacking them will be German-made, there are many echoes of history in this bitter war that none thought would ever happen. This is a conflict whose very parameters have been set by history. Vladimir Putin has attempted to justify his invasion with references to a “fascist coup” in Kyiv. It is a throwback phrase to the Great Patriotic War (as the Second World War is often called in Russia), but meaningless in the current context. The Russian leader has also alleged “genocide” being practiced on ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking citizens, but this is also untrue. The term is defined as the ‘systematic and widespread extermination or attempted extermination of a national, racial, religious, or ethnic group’. If anything, people in the the breakaway Luhansk and Donetsk provinces which comprise the Donbas region had been conducting their own intimidation of non-Russians. If the language of the Russia-Ukraine war harks back to the 1940s, then so do some of the weapons. Read next| War crimes history: will Russia be brought to justice? Recent footage of the pro-Russian militias in the Donbas region reveals that their rifles and anti-tank weapons also date to the 1940s. Almost like historical re-enactors, they are marching into battle with PTRD 1941-era anti-tank rifles and 7.62mm Mosin muskets produced in their tens of millions for Joseph Stalin’s lions. Some of Ukraine’s mobilised citizen defenders have brought out trophy pistols of the Second World War taken by their grandparents, though none would have expected to fire them in anger against a Russian. Read more | Russia-Ukraine crisis: 9 milestone moments in history that explain today’s invasion The Winter War It was during the Winter War of 1939–40, when plucky little Finland stood up to the might of the Soviet Union, that the Finns prepared a nasty surprise for their attackers. They made millions of petrol bombs and named them after the Russian Foreign Minister, Mr Molotov. Today, it is Kharkiv and Kyiv that have borrowed the Finnish recipe book to greet a new generation of Russian invaders with petrol and fire. Molotov cocktails are being made and stored in their millions, ready for the invaders. This war’s tactics are grounded in history as well. When the Russians invaded in February 2022, they brought little extra fuel, mistaken in the belief they would be welcomed with open arms. Instead, Ukraine’s population rose up to oppose their invaders, using what they knew from their schoolbooks of the Great Patriotic War. They practiced “scorched earth”, destroying some of Ukraine’s own infrastructure in an attempt to hinder Russian troops. The history books also teach that any campaigns in the east during February will mean battling with ‘general winter’ – as some poorly-clothed and equipped Russian conscripts have discovered; a lesson that Napoleon or Hitler could have taught them. Every March the winter ice melts the rich Ukrainian loam, creating Rasputitsa, the region’s legendary deep, treacherous mud. This has kept Russian vehicular columns to the main roads and railway lines. Pictures of trucks and even tanks bogged down in Ukrainian mud have shown the inadvisability of leaving hardstanding. To make good their widely advertised losses of transport, the Russian Federation has been rounding up huge numbers of civilian trucks and sending them west on long trains. Strangely enough, this was exactly the Wehrmacht’s solution to its truck shortages in 1941–42, but created more logistical headaches than they were worth, with shortages of spare parts for more than 100 different vehicle types. It is difficult not to believe that today’s Russian Federation forces will suffer the same supply challenges. Russia-Ukraine war: events in context Russia-Ukraine crisis: 9 milestone moments in history that explain today’s invasion “Russia has always refused to let Ukraine go”: Keith Lowe on the long roots of today’s crisis The history of neutrality and what it would mean for Ukraine Nato, Russia, and the history of the post-WW2 tensions “We missed a precious window”: why did America and Russia squander an opportunity for peace in the 1990s? Podcast: Ukraine – the WW2 roots of today's conflict Stalin’s famine: a brief history of the Holodomor in Soviet Ukraine Has Russia always played by its own rules? 9 history podcast episodes that chart Russia and Ukraine's changing interactions with the world What does Iron Curtain mean, and who popularised the term? If I am honest, like the rest of the world, I did not hold out much hope for Ukraine’s survival. However, into the third week of fighting, the incredible seems to have happened. David has hit back at Goliath and the giant has a sore head, partly because of Ukraine’s will to resist, best expressed by the Churchillian figure of Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky urging resistance. Since then, some of Zelensky’s team have widened the Churchillian rhetoric to a plea: “Give us the tools and we will finish the job,” referring to the continued flow of weapons with which the west is currently supplying Ukraine. The cultural reputation of the Russian and Ukrainian armies in 1941–45 rests on the defence of Leningrad, now St Petersburg, and two big city fights of Stalingrad and the capture of Berlin. In the latter cases, Soviet forces encircled the conurbations, stood back and relied on the ‘Red God of War’ – their artillery and rocket forces – to first demoralise the Germans, then pulverise their defensive positions. Only then did Soviet tanks and infantry enter the streets, systematically subduing the areas, block by block. It was time-consuming and extremely costly in casualties. The Germans fought back with hand-held anti-tank weapons and machine-guns. These are precisely the weapons and tactics that Ukraine hopes will prevail against the Patriotic War tactics we expect to be used by Russia in Kyiv and Kharkiv. Read more | Operation Barbarossa: why Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet Union was his greatest mistake While the conflict continues, I shall return to explore the many historical parallels offered by this conflict. For now, we are left with two salutary military lessons from the past. It is often said that “amateurs talk tactics and professionals talk logistics”. Military commanders are constantly reminded that “No plan survives first contact with your enemy”. Both have already rung loud and clear from today’s war in Ukraine. Peter Caddick-Adams is a writer and broadcaster who specialises in military history, defence and security issues. He lectures at universities, military academies and staff colleges around the world and spent 35 years as an officer in the UK Regular and Reserve Forces. His next book, 1945: Victory in the West, is due to be published by Penguin in May 2022 Read next | “Declaring neutrality and it being respected are two different matters”: Peter Caddick-Adams on the history of neutrality and what it would mean for Ukraine
What are the tactics that ensured success in wars and battles of the Second World War and other conflicts? And what mistakes were sure to mean defeat? Historian Peter Caddick-Adams considers the lessons that can be learned, from managing resources and troops to harnessing the unexpected…
At every level of war, a winning formula needs to include an easy-to-understand, clearly defined aim. At the strategic level, it might be to defeat Germany. At a lower level, such an objective could be to capture the city of Berlin, as Soviet premier Joseph Stalin ordered his two subordinates, Marshals Georgy Zhukov and Ivan Konev, in April 1945. Tactically, it might be to take or hold Pegasus Bridge in Normandy, capture a hill like Monte Cassino, or sink a ship, such as the Bismarck. The more complicated the aim, the more scope for confusion and ‘strategic drift’. But for every campaign, there are several factors and tactics to bear in mind. Here are eight lessons learned from history… Raise morale However well-equipped a force, troops must believe in what they are doing, that their cause is just and that they will win. The huge French conscript army in 1940 outnumbered the Germans but were fearful of a replay of the First World War and its massive casualty bill, as were its politicians. Thus, within six-and-a-half weeks the Wehrmacht, with no such doubts and fanatical belief in their nation’s policies, had defeated their adversaries. Morale is about digging deep in a moment of crisis, and persevering – as did exhausted RAF pilots during the Battle of Britain, sailors manning the Atlantic and Arctic convoys, or the citizens of Malta – the most bombed place on earth – believing they would somehow survive. Keep your opponent guessing During the first half of the Second World War, the Germans retained the initiative, choosing when and where to strike – whether this was in Poland, Norway, France, North Africa, Yugoslavia, Greece, or the Soviet Union. The side that chooses offensive action first (properly sustained) gains an advantage, forcing their opponent to react rather than develop their own plans. In this way, warfare is like chess, as British commanders found to their cost in the Western Desert, hampered by General Erwin Rommel, who seemed always to be one step ahead. The same quality, too, determined the early Japanese successes in the Far East, where the Allies were too stretched to defend everywhere equally effectively. “Careless Talk Costs Lives” The famous British World War Two poster reminded everyone – military and civilian alike – that security was an overriding necessity. Any overheard information might be of use to an enemy, so best to be on one’s guard at all times. On a battlefield this translated into making sure your own operating base was secure as you set off to attack your opponent. Thus, the perimeters of airfields were patrolled, and harbour entrances regularly swept for mines and enclosed with nets against submarine attack. On battlefields, troops protected rear areas and forcibly removed civilians so their supply routes would be safe. Partisans in the Soviet Union attacking the German road and railway network severely impeded German military effectiveness in 1943–5. <img src="https://images.immediate.co.uk/production/volatile/sites/7/2021/08/GettyImages-613478080-efd4507.jpg" width="698" height="1024" alt="A wartime cartoon shows two people in conversation at a bar, with glasses shaped like Hitler pretending to listen in the background" title="Wartime posters reminded reminded people that security was an overriding necessity. (Photo by © Hulton-Deutsch Collection/CORBIS/Corbis via Getty Images)" /> Harness the element of surprise Surprise is the greatest weapon in war. It allows a commander to strike at a time and place of their choosing, when their opponent is off-guard. Thus, the 7 December 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Honolulu, caught the United States of America, then a neutral country, at its most relaxed, at 08:00am on a Sunday morning, causing great damage. Often surprise is coupled with deception, persuading your enemy you will do the opposite of what occurs, as with the invasion of Sicily on 9–10 July 1943, when the Allies encouraged Adolf Hitler to expect an invasion elsewhere. Surprise can lead a paralysis of decision-making, as generals are literally shocked into inactivity by the unexpected, which was the effect of the German blitzkrieg of May 1940 on the French high command. Read more: Why didn't America see Pearl Harbor coming? Remember, quality versus quantity Choosing where and when to concentrate your force is a basic skill required in every military commander. This is not always about numbers, but also the quality of troops – whether tiny numbers of SAS attacking the Afrika Korps behind German lines in Libya, or Chindits ambushing larger Japanese units in Burma. However, quantity has a quality all of its own, as the Russians found numerous times on the Eastern front, especially during Operation Uranus from 19 November 1942, the Red Army counterattack which surrounded Stalingrad. “Amateurs Talk Tactics, Professionals Discuss Logistics” The Second World War underlined the necessity for good military logistics, both in manufacturing the right quantities of good equipment, and in terms of transporting them – by land, sea, or air – to where they needed to be. The 2.4m trucks, 640,000 Jeeps and more than 49,000 Sherman tanks manufactured in the USA, and 84,000 T-34 tanks built in the Soviet Union, simply overwhelmed German industrial capacity, exacerbated by the Third Reich’s shortages of oil and other raw materials, such as rubber. Being on the winning side in a resource war would prove as important as raw military force. Expect the unexpected Most of the foregoing skills are the result of training and planning, but what if the unexpected happens? The Second World War, as in every conflict, is full of examples of the need to keep an open mind, retain flexibility, and always have a Plan ‘B’. This was typified by the US Army response to the sudden German attack of 16 December 1944 (the battle of the Bulge), when cooks, clerks and bandsmen fought in the forests around Bastogne, in Belgium. In many ways this is the supreme test for soldiers: good training should ensure that things turn out well in adversity, not only when operations are going to plan. Don’t forget your friends and allies Victory in both world wars and every other 20th century conflict fought by Britain, apart from the Falklands (1982), was the result of co-operation. Locally, this saw the combat arms on a battlefield – principally engineers, infantry, artillery, and armour – fully unite with their air forces. Early failures in both world wars were the result of these arms failing to liaise and integrate. In a wider sense, co-operation entailed working as part of a coalition or alliance. It was the arrival of the Americans into the war, with their vast industrial resources and quick-learning approach to conflict, which turned the tide. The idea of teamwork and sharing risk and capabilities between Allies proved to be war-winning on every front. A winning combination The supreme example of all these factors coming together was D-Day, 6 June 1944. The aim, to land in Normandy, was clear. Morale was high on account of realistic training and the common goal of defeating the Third Reich. The Germans were caught by surprise, partly through deception, and because Allied security was leak-proof. There were setbacks, the weather was awful, and the date altered at the last minute, but commanders and troops proved flexible. Overwhelming force was applied – over 150,000 troops were landed in 48 hours, supported by 12,000 aircraft. The invasion was incredibly well-sustained by a fleet of over 5,000 vessels, including warships of eight nations, and seen as a triumph of international co-operation. The success of Operation Overlord, in defeating Nazi Germany led, indirectly, to the founding of NATO in 1949, still in business as a military alliance today. Peter Caddick-Adams is a full-time writer and broadcaster. He lectures at universities, military academies, and staff colleges around the world on military history, defence, and security issues. He also spent 35 years as an officer in the UK Regular and Reserve Forces, and has extensive experience of various war zones, including in the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan
Churchill and D-Day: did the prime minister oppose the Normandy landings?
HistoryExtra Academy D-Day and the Normandy Campaign course
The Normandy landings were a resounding success for the Allies. Codenamed Operation Overlord, 'D-Day' (6 June 1944) was the largest seaborne invasion in history and marked the beginning of the campaign to liberate north-west Europe from German occupation. But what did British prime minister Winston Churchill make of the plans? Was he, as some have suggested, opposed to D-Day?
Here, military historian Peter Caddick-Adams explores Churchill’s anxieties about the planned assault on Nazi-occupied France and explains why he gained a reputation in American wartime eyes of being against Operation Overlord until the last minute… On 15 May 1944, at St Paul’s School, Hammersmith – General Montgomery’s temporary London headquarters – Winston Churchill attended a final D-Day briefing with King George VI and scores of Allied commanders. As Dwight D Eisenhower recalled in Crusade in Europe: “During the whole war I attended no other conference so packed with rank as this one. This meeting gave us an opportunity to hear a word from both the King and the Prime Minister. The latter made one of his typical fighting speeches, in the course of which he used an expression that struck many of us, particularly the Americans, with peculiar force. He said ‘Gentlemen, I am hardening toward this enterprise’, meaning to us that, though he had long doubted its feasibility and had previously advocated its further postponement in favour of operations elsewhere, he had finally, at this late date, come to believe with the rest of us that this was the true course of action in order to achieve the victory.” Read more | D-day: why the training was deadlier than the assault The undisputed ‘hardening’ quote was published in Eisenhower’s Crusade in Europe of 1948, when the former prime minister was out of office, and illustrated the depth of American scepticism of Churchill’s commitment to invading Normandy. It heralded a narrative that has endured to this day, that Winston Churchill was against landing in Normandy. It is an incorrect understanding of history, though the prime minister was to blame for the confusion. <img src="https://images.immediate.co.uk/production/volatile/sites/7/2019/05/GettyImages-50372111-6354a25-e1717067924263.jpg" width="619" height="413" alt="General Dwight Eisenhower reviews troops shortly before the Normandy invasion, British Army senior officer Bernard Montgomery visible over his right shoulder. (Photo by Frank Scherschel/The LIFE Picture Collection/Getty Images)" title="General Dwight Eisenhower reviews troops shortly before the Normandy invasion, British Army senior officer Bernard Montgomery visible over his right shoulder. (Photo by Frank Scherschel/The LIFE Picture Collection/Getty Images)" /> However, there was a wider context to this. Twice, at Churchill’s behest, the British had lobbied to postpone the invasion of France and instead pursue operations in the Mediterranean, initially in favour of Operation Torch (1942), then for the invasion of Sicily in 1943. Although there were sound military reasons behind both deferrals, American suspicions had grown by the time of Washington DC-based ‘Trident’ Conference of May 1943 that the British prime minister was opposed to a cross-Channel invasion, period. His personal history of having instigated the unsuccessful and costly Gallipoli campaign of 1915 might also have been seen as antipathetic to large-scale amphibious activity. Certainly the lessons from the Anglo-Canadian raid on Dieppe in August 1942, the American reversal at Kasserine in February 1943, and the unexpectedly long German defence of Tunisia must have contributed to Churchill’s scepticism. But the consistency of his own utterances – in favour of operations in the Balkans, bringing Turkey into the war, and a projected assault on Norway, Operation Jupiter – were instrumental in the Americans concluding that the British had lost faith in the cross-Channel option. This was also the view of the Soviets, for whom the only worthwhile second front was a major invasion of German-held France. Churchill on film: the challenges of portraying a Second World War icon The British agreement at ‘Trident’ to an Overlord invasion date of 1 May 1944 (subsequently changed) may have been influenced by concerns that – even though for good military logic – if the UK didn’t facilitate cross-Channel landings in 1944, America would renege on its Germany-first policy. Certainly, whatever Roosevelt’s public position, substantial numbers of aircraft and air corps personnel originally designated for Britain, as well as troops and landing craft, had been redeployed to the Pacific in 1942, to shore up the Guadalcanal campaign. Field Marshal Brooke, chief of the Imperial General Staff, and Churchill were also aware that the US build-up in Britain (Operation Bolero) had only delivered four US divisions in 1942, perhaps indicative that America was also hedging its strategic bets. Read more | Why Churchill’s reputation is still on the line Churchill raised several objections to the Normandy invasion plans drawn up by General Frederick Morgan and his COSSAC staff, but his main anxieties were revealed in his cable to Roosevelt of 23 October 1943. Churchill observed that he was less concerned about winning the beaches, but nervous about whether the Allies could hold out against the German armoured reserves that would arrive soon after. Roosevelt and his joint chiefs remained unmoved, and despite Churchill’s efforts to argue for continued priority in the Mediterranean, the British premier was finally overwhelmed at the Tehran Conference, code-named ‘Eureka’, of November/December 1943. It was there – the first meeting of the wartime ‘Big Three’ – on 29 November that Stalin demanded to know who would command Overlord, the Russian leader not unreasonably surmising that an operation without a leader was not a serious undertaking. This decision was really Roosevelt’s, for America would be supplying the lion’s share of the resources. It was assumed the Overlord job was US Army chief of staff George Marshall’s responsibility; that Eisenhower would replace him as US Army chief of staff in Washington DC; and General Sir Harold Alexander would succeed Ike (Eisenhower) in the Mediterranean. In the event, the president decided he preferred to lean on Marshall at home, and the latter recommended Eisenhower for Overlord. Churchill’s public explanation was that in view of America’s contribution, the overall commander for the French invasion should be a US officer. In private, as far back as the ‘Quadrant’ Conference in Quebec of 17–24 August 1943, there is documentary evidence the British prime minister had offered to ‘trade’ American domination of Overlord for British supremacy in the Mediterranean theatre. <img src="https://images.immediate.co.uk/production/volatile/sites/7/2019/05/GettyImages-529011695-9f88aa7-e1717067951775.jpg" width="619" height="412" alt="Franklin Delano Roosevelt (1882-1945), 32nd President of the USA (right) and Winston Churchill (1874-1965), British Prime Minister, meeting in Quebec in 1944. Churchill is smoking one of his trademark cigars. Churchill and Roosevelt had frequent summit meetings during the war to discuss strategy, usually at Churchill's instigation. After the successful D-Day landings in Normandy in June 1944, the two leaders met in Quebec to agree their policy on the treatment of Germany after the war. (Colorised black and white print). (Photo by Print Collector/Getty Images)" title="Franklin D Roosevelt and Winston Churchill meeting in Quebec, Canada, 1944." /> There may also have been a frisson of schadenfreude at work. If for any reason Overlord failed, a British commander – if not Churchill himself – would face severe criticism from the American public. Having Overlord led by an American was a good insurance policy, were anything to go wrong. Here is the nub of Churchill’s gut instinct towards the cross-Channel invasion: he may not have been as warm to it as the Americans, but he was not against it. However, the prime minister was far more enthralled by the Mediterranean theatre, which he felt held more promise and was a known quantity. Read more | The May 1940 War Cabinet Crisis: Churchill’s darkest hour? Why risk victory in Italy, reasoned Churchill, in favour of the uncertainties of a cross-Channel attack? Ugly geopolitics also lay at the root of this strategic thinking. The Mediterranean was a British-dominated theatre, and the ‘trade’ in handing Overlord to the Americans had ensured that it would remain so. In Winston Churchill’s heart of hearts, he still hoped the attritional slogging match of the Western European war would be decided in the boxing ring of the Mediterranean, under British leadership, even if Overlord were to deliver the final knockout blow. Aware of the post-war damage that rumours of ‘Winston against Overlord’ might do to Anglo-American relations, three years later in Volume 5 of his Second World War Churchill tried – unconvincingly – to qualify the ‘hardening’ comment recorded by Eisenhower. He observed that he had used the ‘hardening’ term earlier in correspondence with Marshall and in speeches, conversation and memos elsewhere, as an antonym of his true meaning. Churchill often used understatement as a linguistic device, when meaning the opposite; but its use here caused the Americans – and subsequent historians – great confusion. The various memos and records of the prime minister’s interest in landing craft design and the artificial harbours, and of his observations from as early as 1940 that sooner or later Britain and her allies would have to mount an amphibious assault against Nazi-occupied Europe, are included in the six volumes of Churchill’s Second World War, which was published during 1948–53. Whilst they demonstrate his undoubted strategic foresight, the wealth of documents Churchill directed to be published as appendices in each volume are there for another purpose altogether. As we have seen, for several reasons the prime minister had gained a reputation in American wartime eyes of being ‘against Overlord until the last minute’. Several American post-war memoirs from the credible circles of Roosevelt, Eisenhower and General Omar Bradley cited the British premier’s opposition as fact. In order to refute such allegations of disloyalty – particularly important during his second 1951–55 premiership, when standing firm against Communism with his wartime ally – Churchill ‘seeded’ each volume of his history with selected documentation to demonstrate he had been committed to a cross-Channel assault from the very start; that he was the visionary, the torch-bearer from as far back as 1940. Indeed, in Volume 5 of his Second World War he explicitly observed that “The reader […] must not be misled […] into thinking (a) that I wanted to abandon ‘Overlord’, (b) that I wanted to deprive ‘Overlord’ of vital resources, or (c) that I contemplated a campaign by armies operating in the Balkan peninsula. These are legends. Never had such a wish entered my mind.” Read more | Did Churchill’s postwar speeches save the world? Which, of course, is nonsense. Churchill was forever contemplating Balkan expeditions, and as the historian David Reynolds has ably demonstrated in Command of History: Churchill Fighting and Writing the Second World War (Allen Lane, 2004), the documents that Churchill included were the subject of much debate and scrutiny by the writing team who helped him write the Second World War, with some even doctored (to the extent of paragraphs and sentences omitted) to enhance the premier’s post-war reputation, making Churchill’s ‘truth’ about his support for Overlord, and other matters, much less objective. <img src="https://images.immediate.co.uk/production/volatile/sites/7/2019/05/GettyImages-102165893-5551c32-e1717068001219.jpg" width="619" height="413" alt="As David Reynolds has demonstrated, some of the documents that Churchill included were doctored (to the extent of paragraphs and sentences omitted) to enhance the premier’s post-war reputation.(Photo by Central Press/Hulton Archive/Getty Images)" title="As David Reynolds has demonstrated, some of the documents that Churchill included were doctored (to the extent of paragraphs and sentences omitted) to enhance the premier’s post-war reputation.(Photo by Central Press/Hulton Archive/Getty Images)" /> However, once Overlord became irreversible, Churchill himself determined to be present off the coast of France. Deaf to the pleas of his military commanders and Eisenhower, he only agreed to defer his visit to Normandy at the insistence of King George VI. Otherwise HMS Belfast– today moored in the Thames – would bear a brass plaque screwed to her deck, reading: “Here stood Winston Churchill on 6 June 1944, watching the invasion of Normandy.” Discover more learning from week one of the HistoryExtra Academy course on D-Day and the Normandy Campaign Video lecture: The Decision, with Taylor Downing – watching time 11 mins Barbarossa and Britain – reading time 9 mins Podcast: D-Day: everything you wanted to know – listening time 54 mins When and why did the US get involved in WW2 – reading time 9 mins
Exclusive podcast: Peter Caddick-Adams on whether D-Day could have failed
In this lecture recorded at BBC History Magazine’s 2019 History Weekends, historian Peter Caddick-Adams explores the key threats to the assault of 6 June 1944
In this lecture recorded at BBC History Magazine’s 2019 History Weekends – and available exclusively on HistoryExtra.com – historian Peter Caddick-Adams explores the key threats to the assault of 6 June 1944, a high-risk strategy that had just one chance of success. Listen to more podcasts exclusive to HistoryExtra.com Discover more learning from week two of the HistoryExtra Academy course on D-Day and the Normandy Campaign HistoryExtra Academy video lecture: Planning for D-Day – watching time 16 mins The road to D-Day: the masterplan – reading time 9 mins Podcast: Peter Caddick-Adams on whether D-Day could have failed – listening time 1 hour In defence of Monty: James Holland on the Allied commander's D-Day decisions – reading time 9 mins Churchill, Stalin and Roosevelt: the big three’s war of words – reading time 9 mins
Everything you wanted to know about history (podcast series)
Military historian Peter Caddick-Adams responds to listener queries and popular search enquiries about one of the defining episodes of World War Two
In the latest of our new series tackling the big questions on major historical topics, military historian Peter Caddick-Adams responds to listener queries and popular search enquiries about one of the defining episodes of World War Two. Check out the rest of the series: Episode 3: Miles Russell answers the big questions about Roman Britain Episode 2: Tracy Borman takes on questions about the Tudors Episode 1: Marc Morris tackles some of the big questions about the Normans Discover more learning from week one of the HistoryExtra Academy course on D-Day and the Normandy Campaign Video lecture: The Decision, with Taylor Downing – watching time 11 mins Churchill and D-Day: did the prime minister oppose the Normandy landings? – reading time 8 mins Barbarossa and Britain – reading time 9 mins When and why did the US get involved in WW2 – reading time 9 mins
The road to D-Day: getting ready for action
As their plans to liberate Europe gathered pace, the Allies knew that every stage of the invasion would have to be carried out with razor-like precision. Soon, thousands of troops were being put through rigorous training exercises – some of which turned out to be as deadly as the real thing. By historian Peter Caddick-Adams
Land: Before the troops could leave Britain’s shores, they would have to conquer Devon first On the eve of the invasion, the build-up of troops in the British Isles was so large, servicemen joked that Britain was only being kept afloat by the number of barrage balloons attached to her. Indeed, a total of 2,876,600 soldiers, sailors and airmen were awaiting the call in southern England, and key to their success on D-Day would be the fact that each and every one of them had experienced far longer and more meaningful combat preparation than their opponents across the Channel. However, as US infantry divisions underwent extensive training along the coast of Devon, accidents were not uncommon. Many of the exercises were necessarily dangerous, involving live artillery, mines and machine gun fire. Captain Charles R Cawthon remembered the sad fate that befell one member of his platoon, who triggered a mine laid in the dunes: “There was a blinding flash and a clap of sound, and he disappeared as if by a magician’s sleight of hand. The illusion terminated in pieces of anatomy plopping into the sand around us.” D-day: why the training was deadlier than the assault D-Day: a resounding success for the Allies D-Day: 24 hours that changed the world Another American officer, Second-Lieutenant Wesley R Ross, recalled: “The day before we left for the marshalling area, we lost Melvin Vest, who was killed when a quarter-pound block of TNT exploded in his hand. I bundled up Vest and hustled him by truck to a nearby hospital, but he died of shock four hours later from extensive damage to his hands, legs and groin. This was a gut-wrenching disaster, and the fact that he was such a neat guitar-playing soldier and so well liked by everyone, made it even more of a tragedy.” When the time finally came to head across to Normandy, large crowds of locals lined the streets to wish the departing men both goodbye and good luck, sensing this time that the troops would not be returning. Omaha beach-bound Sergeant Hyam Haas, a draftee from Brooklyn, remembered a moving sight as they travelled towards their marshalling areas. “When we left Exmouth on 30 May, the townsfolk lined the streets and cheered us on – many of them in tears. It seemed as if the entire nation was in motion… This was the biggest parade ever; the only thing missing were the marching bands. There was constant cheering as we went through towns – everyone knew what was happening.” Air: If the opening stages of D-Day were to go to plan, those taking to the skies would require a realistic dress rehearsal Tasked with capturing bridges, coastal routes and key points in Normandy’s road network, paratroopers and glider troops would be vital to D-Day’s success. As such, their fitness training was rigorous and often gruelling. Lance-Corporal John Ross, who joined the Canadian Parachute Battalion of the British 6th Airborne Division, remembered: “In August and September 1943, we ran five miles every morning and completed a 50-mile march with full gear in 18 hours.” Two US Airborne Divisions, the 82nd and 101st, were also stationed in England. On 11–14 May, their preparations culminated with ‘Exercise Eagle’, where paratroopers and glider troops descended on Berkshire to take on their ‘enemy’ – in reality, members of the US 28th Infantry Division. Keen to replicate the impending events as much as possible, they flew out of the airfields they would use for the actual invasion. Ominously, eight of the nine C-47 aircraft carrying men of the 502nd Parachute Infantry dropped their jumpers nine miles from the intended drop zone, anticipating what would happen on D-Day a month later. While bombers pounded coastal fortifications and fighters practised air-to-ground attacks, a 33-year-old Californian – Lieutenant-Colonel Joel L Crouch – rehearsed with plane-loads of navigational pathfinders. Listen | Giles Milton on lesser-known stories of soldiers and civilians who were involved in the Normandy landings Airborne forces had suffered heavily from fratricide over Sicily in July 1943, and Crouch’s own aircrew had been responsible for some of the errors. Fine pilots they may have been, but they struggled at flying in formation in poor weather or under fire. To iron out these shortcomings, Crouch ran a Pathfinder School to train the men for their perilous job of being “the spearhead of the spearhead”. In order to transport the two US divisions, 1,116 aircrew were assembled, albeit with only enough trained navigators for 40 per cent of the fleet. Together, they would tow 1,118 small gliders capable of carrying 13 men (and two pilots) each, as well as 301 larger British-manufactured Horsas. As Lieutenant Russell Chandler Jr, flying with the 44th Squadron, 316th Troop Carrier Group of the Ninth Air Force, recollected: “We started on daytime jumps, moving on to night-time work, dropping those guys at 600 feet. Once the shroud line was pulled, they were on the ground in seconds. Our biggest fear in training was friendly fire as we had lost many aircraft that way in Sicily, but the one thing we couldn’t replicate was the German flak we would receive over Normandy.” It was during this time that Chandler also witnessed an unnerving training accident, which set the men on edge: “The lead aircraft in front of me suddenly climbed up out of formation, for what reason we will never know, and collided with another plane crossing overhead. That aircraft was carrying the commander, the chaplain and other high-ranking officers. We flew directly through the flames and debris, which gave us a horrible foretaste of what the ‘Big Day’ might be like.” Sea: An operation dubbed ‘Exercise Tiger’ was to be a crucial part of naval preparations – but ended up a costly disaster Up in Scotland, young American, British and Canadian naval crewmen were taught how to communicate by light and flag, maintain position, turn in formation, and deploy from a column formation into line abreast (side by side). They also learned the rudiments of small boat handling, seamanship and – vitally important for D-Day – tides and coastal navigation. For, as an admiral pointed out: “If you were in a landing craft looking towards the coast of France, from 10 miles away, with a freeboard [the distance from deck to waterline] of six or seven feet, you just wouldn’t see the shore.” On 27–28 April 1944, US troops rehearsed their upcoming assault on Utah beach in a large operation off the coast of Devon named ‘Exercise Tiger’. On the second day, however, disaster struck when the ships were attacked by nine Kriegsmarine E-boats. To add to the confusion, many soldiers thought the attack was part of the exercise. As Lieutenant Eugene E Eckstam, medical officer aboard the tank landing ship LST-507, remembered: “General quarters rudely aroused us about 01:30. I remember hearing gunfire and saying they had better watch where they were shooting or someone would get hurt. Suddenly there was a horrendous noise accompanied by the sound of crunching metal and dust everywhere.” D-Day in numbers: 4 infographics that show the big picture Churchill and D-Day: did the prime minister oppose the Normandy landings? D-Day on screen: 5 TV and film depictions of the Second World War operation Eckstam’s vessel was one of three hit by torpedoes; it lost all power and was dead in the water. He opened a hatch and “… found myself looking into a raging inferno. It was impossible to enter. The screams and cries of those army troops in there still haunt me.” The fire forced those who survived the initial carnage to abandon ship at 02:30, when Eckstam “...watched the most spectacular fireworks ever. Gas cans exploding and the enormous fire blazing only a few yards away are sights forever etched in my memory.” An estimated 946 US servicemen lost their lives in Exercise Tiger. The disastrous incident was then covered up from fear that it would destroy morale ahead of the pivotal invasion. When the time came for the final departure, King George VI reviewed the assembled fleets of nearly 7,000 craft in a US patrol boat. “The cook provided His Majesty with coffee,” recalled its skipper, Harold B Sherwood. “On leaving, the king complimented our cook on a most excellent cup of coffee. After that, any complaints about his chow were silenced by: ‘If it’s good enough for the King of England, it’s good enough for youse guys’.” For many of those awaiting the call to action, the impending invasion was hard to process. Seaman Charles ‘Buster’ Shaeff from Norristown, Pennsylvania, had volunteered for the US Navy at 17. As he left Weymouth, he “…wasn’t apprehensive about going in; I was an 18-year-old kid who figured nothing would happen to me. You think – if it happens, it’ll happen to someone else.” Discover more content from week three of the HistoryExtra Academy course on D-Day and the Normandy Campaign HistoryExtra Academy video lecture: Deceiving the Nazis – watching time 14 mins D-Day: why the training was deadlier than the assault – reading time 11 mins The Allies’ big idea: the largest air battle of the Second World War – reading time 9 mins "Hitler slept through D-Day", plus four other facts about the Normandy Landings you might not know... – reading time 5 mins