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Hungary's freedom fight: how one nation's resistance to Soviet tyranny changed history forever
Seventy years ago, Hungarians incensed by repression rose up against the country’s communist regime – and were brutally crushed. Martyn Rady reveals how the memory of 1956 rehabilitated the nation’s reputation, and is still used today as a political weapon

Published: November 18, 2026 at 3:30 PM
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The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 was not a media event. The surviving photographs of its course and suppression by Soviet tanks are mostly grainy, and the few snatches of film are frustratingly short. But one photograph stands out: a portrait of a girl in a padded jacket and fur cap holding a sub-machine gun. Taken in Budapest by the Danish photographer Vagn Hansen on 1 November 1956, a week after the outbreak of the uprising, it was first published in the Danish magazine Billed Bladet and reproduced across the world. It became the face of resistance to Soviet tyranny.
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Hansen was not the only journalist to take an image of the girl, but it was not until the late 2000s that her identity was confirmed as Erika Széles, a catering apprentice just 15 years old at the time. Erika did not live long enough to see her face in the international press. By the time the photo appeared in Billed Bladet on 13 November, she had been dead for a week – killed in a shoot-out with Soviet troops after she’d gone to rescue a wounded companion. A square in Budapest is now named in her honour.
The portrait of Erika does not just commemorate courage. It stands, too, for Hungary’s rehabilitation and for the way in which the 1956 revolution altered perceptions of the country.

Erika Széles, pictured by Danish photographer Vagn Hansen in Budapest, 1 November 1956; a week later the 15-year-old was shot dead by Soviet troops | Credit: Getty Images
Rewriting history
Hungary’s story in the first half of the 20th century makes for a bad one. It fought on the ‘wrong’ side in both world wars and, in 1920, was the first modern European power to pass antisemitic legislation. Its native fascist movement, the Arrow Cross, had in 1944–45 been no less genocidal than its Nazi counterpart, slaughtering tens of thousands of Jews, many of whom they shot on Budapest’s Danube embankment.
With the Soviet takeover after 1945, Hungary’s new communist rulers became the most slavish of Stalin’s acolytes, brutally imposing a rigid ideology with the help of a sadistic secret police force. Possibly as many as one-tenth of its people were hauled before the courts on political grounds or on charges of economic ‘sabotage’. Purges, show trials, torture and internment without trial were parts of everyday life. When, in his 1949 novel Nineteen Eighty-Four, George Orwell described the future as a “boot stamping on a human face”, he could have been writing about postwar Hungary.
The 1956 revolution redeemed the country. Not only did its people prove that they were not Stalinist stooges, they also demonstrated and fought in the streets. Up to 3,000 were killed in battles in Budapest and other Hungarian cities. The revolutionaries took on a Soviet army of 200,000 men and 5,000 tanks equipped with only light arms and petrol bombs. Their bravery inspired another portrait, this time an artist’s generic impression: the ‘Hungarian Freedom Fighter’, chosen by Time magazine as its 1956 ‘Man of the Year’.

Hungarian revolutionaries cling to a Soviet tank rumbling into Budapest during the uprising. Perhaps 3,000 were killed in clashes with communist forces | Credit: AKG
In the wake of the revolution’s violent suppression, refugees flooded out. Over several months, 200,000 Hungarians fled to the west, some 20,000 of whom came to the UK. Most of the refugees were less than 40 years old, and many belonged to the professions. Altogether, about 20 per cent of Hungarians who had received a post-secondary-school education migrated to the west, including about half of the faculty and students of the Sopron School of Forestry, which relocated en masse to the University of British Columbia in Canada.
Young and versatile, some of the refugees went on to become world-leading scientists, academics and literary figures. Others would use the skills that they had already mastered in the service of their new homelands. Chef Lajos Permayer set up the Louis patisserie on Heath Street in Hampstead, north London. And after several years in the sporting wilderness, legendary footballer Ferenc Puskás moved to Spain in 1958 and signed for Real Madrid. Almost universally, the refugees proved themselves ‘good citizens’ whose example did much to eclipse the more disagreeable features of Hungary’s recent past.
Reputational damage
Hungary’s rehabilitation came at the cost of Soviet communism’s reputation. Throughout western Europe, communist parties suffered a haemorrhaging of membership. The aggressive defence of the Soviet military intervention by the Italian, French and British Communist Party leaders disillusioned the rank and file; roughly a third of their members now drifted off to join the mainstream socialist movement or fringe Trotskyite groups. Many eventually embraced the democratic alternative of Euro-Communism and the ideal of a communism freed from Soviet oversight.

The generic ‘Hungarian Freedom Fighter’ was named 1956 Man of the Year by Time magazine, reflecting international views of the rebels’ bravery in the face of harsh Soviet repression | Credit: Alamy
Among those leaving the Communist Party of Great Britain was the journalist Peter Fryer, who wrote for the Daily Worker (later renamed the Morning Star) and went to Budapest in 1956 to report on the revolution. Fryer was outraged by the Daily Worker’s editorial decision to call the Hungarian uprising a “counter-revolution”, and by the continued spiking of his articles. One of his pieces, which the Daily Worker did not print, gave this account of the revolution’s origins: “After 11 years the incessant mistakes of the communist leaders, the brutality of the State Security Police, the widespread bureaucracy and mismanagement, the bungling, the arbitrary methods and the lies have led to total collapse. This was… the upsurge of a whole people… against a police dictatorship dressed up as a Socialist society.”
Fryer’s assessment was shrewd, but the bungling also went right to the top of the Soviet bloc. Ultimately, it was the Soviet leadership that misjudged events and made Hungary ripe for revolution.
With Stalin’s death in March 1953, the collective Soviet leadership – headed first by Georgy Malenkov then, after 1955, by Nikita Khrushchev – began the dismantling of the old dictator’s legacy. The gulags started to open, consumer goods became available, and economic priorities shifted from heavy industry to light manufacturing and housebuilding. Soviet cities such as Moscow and Kyiv suddenly brightened up, with restaurants opening to cater to a smart clientele, food stores offering more than just bottled vegetables, even a scattering of teddy boys dressed in what they took to be western fashions.
Soviet leadership misjudged events and made Hungary ripe for revolution
The Soviet leadership intended that the ‘New Course’, as it was known, would be adopted by the satellites – and that meant that the old guard who had dominated the Hungarian Communist Party would have to give way. Power there had been concentrated in the hands of Mátyás Rákosi, who was simultaneously prime minister and head of the Communist Party, known after 1948 as the Hungarian Workers’ Party. An engaging personality with fluent English and a distinctive Yul Brynner profile, Rákosi was also vicious and manipulative.

The staunch Stalinist Mátyás Rákosi was berated by Soviet top brass in 1953, but clawed his way back to power | Credit: Topfoto
Summoned to Moscow in June 1953 to meet Soviet party bosses, Rákosi bore the full brunt of their criticism. Everything he had done had been wrong, Khrushchev explained, from backing heavy industry to orchestrating purges and show trials. The other Soviet leaders chimed in, accusing Rákosi of bossiness, abuse of power, and disregarding legal process.
Rákosi did what was expected of a good communist. He admitted his mistakes and agreed to give up the office of prime minister, while retaining leadership of the party. His successor as prime minister was the veteran communist Imre Nagy. The Soviet leadership trusted Nagy, who had long reported on his colleagues to the Soviet secret police, but they had underestimated Rákosi. When Nagy did as he thought the Soviet leadership wanted by relaxing controls over society and easing up on industrialisation, Rákosi mobilised the party against him, accusing Nagy of “splintering revisionism”. In the contest between the two communist leaders, Hungarian writers and intellectuals lined up behind Nagy but the Soviet leadership reluctantly backed Rákosi as a flawed but more reliable communist. The Kremlin was worried in particular that Nagy’s talk of political pluralism and of broadening decision-making could only weaken communist control in Hungary.
Nagy’s fall was swift. At Moscow’s direction, the 70-strong Central Committee of the Hungarian Workers’ Party denounced him in March 1955 for “party-damaging, anti-Marxist, opportunistic and right-leaning tendencies”. Nagy was progressively stripped of his offices and, at the end of the year, expelled from the party altogether.

Imre Nagy, Hungarian prime minister for under two years from July 1953 before being ousted, misjudged Moscow’s appetite for reform | Credit: Getty Images
Winter of discontent
In November 1955, a new theatre production opened in Budapest: Shakespeare’s Richard III. It was a sell-out, attracting theatregoers who easily read the politics of the day into “the winter of our discontent” and the villainy of the king. That show was typical of the way that arts and culture began to define Hungarian politics. Theatres, poetry readings and discussion groups increasingly provided forums for the coded criticism of communist policies and of Rákosi’s leadership.
But Moscow was giving mixed messages. In February 1956, at the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, Khrushchev denounced Stalin and the brutality and incompetence of his rule. Supposedly secret, the speech was soon leaked and gave hope to reformers throughout the Soviet bloc. Amid conditions verging on civil war, the communist party in Poland broke free of Moscow’s control, appointing Władysław Gomułka as leader despite Khrushchev’s disapproval of him. (Significant, enduring democratic reforms would, however, have to wait until 1989).
In Hungary, meanwhile, pressure grew for a political amnesty and pardon. These rumblings culminated in the ceremonial reburial of one of Rákosi’s victims, László Rajk – a communist mass-murderer as odious as Rákosi himself, but hanged on bogus charges in 1949 – which attracted as many as 200,000 onlookers. Student halls of residence and university classrooms became centres of political discussion; one academic debate on freedom of the press drew an audience of no fewer than 7,000.
Student halls of residence and university classrooms became centres of political discussion
Visiting Hungary in July 1956, the senior Soviet politician Anastas Mikoyan found only chaos. He reported back to Moscow in alarm:
“Day after day the comrades are further losing their grip on power. A parallel centre is forming from enemy elements operating actively, decisively and self-confidently. The press and radio are not under Central Committee control any more… In this dangerous situation, the party leadership practically exists in a state of prostration.”
There was only one thing for it: jettison Rákosi. But the Soviet decision in July 1956 to appoint another communist dinosaur, Ernő Gerő, as Rákosi’s successor and party boss showed the limits of the Kremlin’s thinking. Communists tend to believe that they have the masses on their side. When they find that they do not, they panic – history is not turning out as it should. On 23 October, a student demonstration to show solidarity with the reformers in Poland turned violent when the security police shot at the crowd. The demonstrators responded by seizing weapons and pulling down the massive statue of Stalin that loomed over the city centre. As the fighting intensified, with revolutionaries taking on Soviet tanks, Gerő rang up Moscow to ask for military help.

Hungarians stare at the monumental statue of Stalin, which was torn down from its perch near Budapest’s National Theatre and dismembered by rebels in 1956 | Credit: Getty Images
Moscow was uncertain what to do. The leadership was divided between hardliners who favoured armed intervention and pragmatists – led by Khrushchev – who hoped for a political solution. In the event, Gerő was dismissed, Nagy was brought back as prime minister and the party leadership was given to the moderate János Kádár. On 28 October, the Soviet commander Marshal Georgy Zhukov ordered all Soviet troops in Hungary to return to barracks.
It looked as if the revolution had won, but Nagy was not in control of events. The Hungarian leadership earnestly debated how to repair broken windows and rewrite history textbooks in schools, while simultaneously giving way to increasingly radical demands from the streets – for the removal of all Soviet troops from Hungary, for a multiparty democracy with free elections, even for breaking Hungary’s military alliance with the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, revolutionaries slaughtered several hundred Workers’ Party officials and shot captured secret policemen.
It was the murder of communists, “our people”, that forced Khrushchev’s hand. On top of this, as Khrushchev explained to his colleagues in Moscow, the progress of the revolution in Hungary made it likely that a ‘capitalist’ restoration was imminent, which could only diminish Soviet prestige. So, on 31 October, Khrushchev gave the order for a full-scale military invasion. What followed was a textbook operation. Over several days, Soviet troops and tanks began covert manoeuvres which effectively sealed off Budapest and other cities. Then, on 4 November, with Budapest encircled, the assault commenced with armoured columns punching their way into the capital along the main highways. The countdown to Erika Széles’s murder had begun.
János Kádár became Moscow’s man in post-revolutionary Hungary. He saw to the prosecution and judicial murder of the leading revolutionaries – including Imre Nagy, latterly the figurehead of the revolution, who was hanged in 1958.

Moscow’s pick to lead post-revolutionary Hungary, János Kádár – here with Nikita Khrushchev in 1964 – was a relatively benign dictator, though talk of 1956 was stifled | Credit: Getty Images
Signs of progress
Kádár ruled Hungary for the next 32 years. His regime was mostly benign: there was censorship, but an underground press flourished. Dissidents were harassed but seldom jailed. The shops were full. Coming to Budapest as a postgrad student in the late seventies, I was surprised and relieved to find that my local ABC had as great a variety of food on offer as the West Hampstead International supermarket (now a Sainsbury’s) where I had shopped in London.
Political debate was allowed, but discussion of 1956 was off limits; the revolution was euphemistically referred to as ‘the events’. My landlord in Budapest, an old conservative, blamed the west for not coming to Hungary’s aid. “We won’t go onto the streets again,” he would say with a shrug of his shoulders.
In fact, Hungarians did not need to return to the streets. Once Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev had let the communist bosses of the satellites know that they could not expect Moscow to intervene on their behalf, the game was up.
In June 1989, Hungary’s communist leaders ceded to popular demands for the ceremonial reburial of Imre Nagy, giving him a state funeral in front of 300,000 mourners. Over the following few months, they peacefully surrendered power in return for immunity from criminal prosecution and their pension entitlements.

The grave of Imre Nagy, hanged in 1958 as the figurehead of the revolution. His reburial in Budapest in 1989 was attended by 300,000 mourners | Credit: Alamy
Contested memory
After 1989, memory of 1956 became one of the symbols around which Hungarians built a new democratic nation. As one of its first acts, the new Hungarian parliament made 23 October an official holiday, while Plot 301 – where the communist leaders had ordered the burial in unmarked graves of Nagy and other murdered revolutionaries – was made into a site of national mourning.
Even so, memory of 1956 is still contested by left and right. For the left, the revolution was a fight for democracy, civil liberties and the rights of the individual. For the right, it was, above all, a struggle against tyranny of all types. Viktor Orbán, the long-serving rightwing prime minister of Hungary (in power 1998–2002 and 2010–2026), likened his country’s fight against the Soviet Union to his own battle against the ‘tyrannical’ rule of Brussels and the European Union.
Orbán and his political party, Fidesz, have a bad reputation – and deservedly so. Accused of harassing migrants with razor-wire fences and tear gas, closing down opposition media, gerrymandering elections and undermining the judiciary, Orbán and his lackeys seemed little different from the tyrants they claimed to despise. Indeed, Orbán happily lined up with fellow authoritarians – not only Vladimir Putin (“a fair partner”) but also Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (“one of my personal friends”) and President Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan (“a model state… stable, predictable and successful”).
Orbán and his lackeys seemed little different from the tyrants they claimed to despise
On top of this, Orbán’s stooges plundered the state to make themselves Hungary’s richest men, unashamedly advertising their wealth with private jets and castles. Kickbacks, single-bidder contracts and smears, often loaded with a dose of antisemitism, made what had been a functioning democracy into a kleptocracy.

Viktor Orbán, the former rightwing leader of Hungary, who drew parallels between his country’s fight against Soviet oppression and his own battles with the European Union | Credit: Getty Images
Since Fidesz was roundly defeated in the parliamentary election of April 2026, the photogenic Péter Magyar has been Hungary’s new prime minister. A former Fidesz stalwart who broke with Orbán as recently as 2024, Magyar heads up an umbrella party with little ideological glue. In Magyar’s rhetoric, 1956 is a key plank – one that he invokes in the name of national unity, of making a clean break with the recent past, and of reorient ing Hungarian policy away from Moscow. Even so, after Orbán’s tenure, Hungary’s reputation as one of Europe’s bad boys is close to where it was before 1956. Péter Magyar has work to do.
Martyn Rady was a student in Hungary in the late 1970s, and is now Masaryk professor emeritus of central European history at University College London. His next book, Eastern Europe: A New History, will be published by Allen Lane in 2027
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This article was first published in the December 2026 issue of HistoryExtra Magazine
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