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How should war criminals be punished? We asked a historian for their view
How should we prosecute those who perpetrate war crimes? This is a challenge that the global community has confronted since the end of the First World War – with, as historian Devin Pendas tells Danny Bird, mixed results

Published: November 20, 2026 at 3:30 PM
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Danny Bird: In September, Hashim Thaçi, former president of Kosovo, was convicted of war crimes committed in the Kosovo War, following a trial in The Hague. What does the case reveal about how trials of this nature have evolved over the past century?
Devin Pendas: Two things stand out. First, the principle that heads of state can be prosecuted for acts of state is now firmly established. Sovereignty traditionally meant acts of state were not crimes, even when Kaiser Wilhelm II’s trial was mooted after the First World War. Later, Nuremberg shifted that in theory, but Hitler was dead, so the principle was never established. In the 1990s, prosecutors pursuing crimes during Yugoslavia’s breakup pushed hard for it. Slobodan Milošević’s unfinished trial was the first real attempt, and Hashim Thaçi’s conviction confirms the precedent.
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The second point to make is that this principle is applied unevenly. Weak powers, small countries and deposed leaders are far likelier to be prosecuted than sitting heads of state, or leaders, current or former, of great powers.

Kosovo Albanians protest the conviction of former Kosovan president Hashim Thaçi for war crimes, September 2026. The verdict confirmed a precedent set by the trial of Slobodan Milošević | Credit: Getty Images
What are these courts actually prosecuting, and what separates war crimes from crimes against humanity?
International criminal law has four core crimes: war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and aggression. The first three are atrocity crimes, involving the mistreatment of civilians and non-combatants.
War crimes can be sporadic: a lieutenant who loses control and orders his men to massacre a village has committed one. Crimes against humanity must be, in the legal term, widespread or systematic, which implies deliberate policy: orders from commanders, most probably from generals or civilian leaders, rather than rogue action.
Genocide is a crime against humanity with an added ‘special intent’. Victims are targeted because they belong to a protected racial, religious, ethnic or national group (not a political one), with the intent to destroy that group in whole or in part. It turns on the perpetrators’ state of mind, which the others don’t require.
Did prosecuting wartime atrocities begin at Nuremberg?
No. The history of war crimes prosecutions is longer and crimes against humanity were raised after the First World War, notably over the Armenian genocide [the systematic killing of up to 1.2 million people in the Ottoman empire between 1915 and 1916]. Almost all earlier trials were conducted in national courts. Nothing developed in terms of international prosecutions, or in terms of codifying crimes against humanity, until Nuremberg made them a legal category through the London Charter of 1945, the treaty that authorised the trials.
War crimes, by contrast, belong to customary law dating to the Middle Ages, with codification beginning in the 19th century and prosecutions after the American Civil War.

Slobodan Milošević was the first former head of state to be prosecuted for war crimes. He died before a verdict was reached | Credit: Getty Images
When did genocide become a crime in its own right?
The term was coined by Raphael Lemkin, a Polish Jewish lawyer who fled the Nazis, in a wartime book on Axis occupation policy in eastern Europe. Lemkin argued that genocide is distinct because it destroys communities, and their members, targeting something fundamental to their identity that they cannot change.
He lobbied relentlessly, visiting every politician who would see him. He wanted genocide to be prosecuted at Nuremberg, but negotiators chose crimes against humanity as a broader category. He did get it onto the new United Nations’ agenda – and its Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was passed, making genocide prosecutable later.
How did nation-states come to accept that some crimes transcend borders?
It has been one of the biggest fights of the last 80 years. Sovereignty, the principle that states answer for their own territory, dates back at least to the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. It arose because Europe’s Wars of Religion were fuelled by Protestant and Catholic states fighting to protect co-religionists abroad, a spiral lasting around a century. It asserted that, in principle, what a state does to its citizens is nobody else’s business – though, in practice, interventions often continued.
However, the world wars in the 20th century convinced many that some crimes are so evil, and so prone to spill across borders, that they cannot be left to the caprice of individual states. They concern the international community and warrant international prosecution, at least case by case.
The world wars of the 20th century convinced many that some crimes are so evil they cannot be left to individual states
Suspicion persisted and still does. At Nuremberg, the Americans and Soviets agreed on little except that the precedent must not touch their domestic conduct – notably Stalin’s mass killings, and lynchings in the Jim Crow South. Their solution was to tie international jurisdiction to aggression. The real crime was invading Poland; massacring 3 million Polish Jews became an international matter because Germany invaded first.
Your own research examines the postwar Nazi trials, notably the Frankfurt Auschwitz trials of 1963–68. What do they reveal about justice, historical understanding and public memory?
Advocates of prosecuting political atrocities typically make two arguments. The first is deterrence and the second is pedagogy. On that second point, Nuremberg’s prosecutors said they were teaching the world, especially Germans, about their government’s past evil to help forge democracy and a culture of human rights.
The record is more complicated because trials draw publicity, and some react with shock and resolve while others reject them outright. Critics denounced Nuremberg as victors’ justice, even a high-grade lynching party, and Serbs said much the same of the Yugoslavia tribunal.

Defendants at the Frankfurt Auschwitz trials of 1963–68. “Many Germans concluded that the accused were singular psychopaths, and nothing to do with them,” says Devin Pendas | Credit: Getty Images
At the Frankfurt trials in the 1960s, many Germans concluded that the accused were singular psychopaths, unrepresentative of German society and nothing to do with them or their parents. They accepted that the perpetrators deserved punishment, but took it to mean everyone else, including those who voted for Hitler, was innocent. Trials can become an alibi: “We prosecuted 20 people. What more do you want from me?”
How did the Yugoslavia and Rwanda tribunals build on Nuremberg?
After Nuremberg, plans for a permanent international criminal court collapsed amid Cold War resistance and fears of neocolonialism. Then things began to change. The end of the Cold War coincided with the Yugoslav wars, followed by genocide in Rwanda. Opposition had weakened as post-Soviet Russia was courting the west. That opened a window to revive the Nuremberg model through tribunals. These were one-off bodies, usually created by the UN, each handling a single set of crimes.
They changed three things. First, genocide was now chargeable. Second, they prosecuted heads of state. Rwanda’s was dead, but Serbia’s Milošević was tried, and although he died in prison before a verdict, it was the first prosecution of a former head of state. After the Second World War, Hitler was dead and the Japanese emperor untried, so the question stayed open until these tribunals resolved it.
After Nuremberg, plans for a permanent international criminal court collapsed amid Cold War resistance and fears of neocolonialism
Third, they changed how eyewitnesses are treated. Testifying is traumatic. For example, you may be asked to describe how your parents were murdered when you were 12, then face cross-examination – “Were you wearing your glasses? Are you sure it was your parents?” – or worse, be accused of seeking revenge and money. At Nuremberg and Frankfurt, witnesses were left alone. Many suffered breakdowns. The new tribunals institutionalised support-staff psychologists, training for attorneys to ask hard questions without insulting witnesses – and therapy afterwards. This made testimony far more bearable.
- Read more | Before the Nuremberg Trials, this was Winston Churchill’s shocking plan for Nazi war criminals
What can trials offer the victims?
Victim witnesses, from Nuremberg to the International Criminal Court (ICC), have mixed views. I have never met one who called it a waste of time, as they want justice and the truth told. But they are often frustrated, because defendants have rights to a defence, cross-examination and denial. Watching the man who murdered your parents say “I don’t know what this guy’s talking about” is infuriating.
Punishments often seem inadequate. International tribunals have no death penalty – nor do German courts – though Adolf Eichmann’s trial in Israel was a notable exception. Accomplices to murder in Germany often get three to seven years. A survivor may see the killer sentenced to five years, but only serving two and a half after being released early with heart trouble.
And a fair trial lets the defence tell its story: it didn’t happen, wasn’t my responsibility, wasn’t so bad, your side did it, too, etcetera. That must be allowed to happen. But for survivors, it can be traumatising, frustrating and politically damaging.

Archbishop Desmond Tutu pictured in 1998. His Truth and Reconciliation Commission aimed to help South Africa heal in the aftermath of Apartheid, yet it proved controversial | Credit: Reuters
What happens after the verdict? Can trials aid reconciliation, or might they deepen divisions?
Whether reconciliation should even be a goal is controversial. Desmond Tutu championed it in South Africa, where a Truth and Reconciliation Commission offered perpetrators immunity in exchange for testimony. The idea of truth instead of justice was something many survivors found insulting.
Even where perpetrators serve time, there is an expectation that, for instance, Croats, Serbs and Bosnians will live as neighbours again. That is a great deal to ask of someone whose torturer or family’s killer is to be forgiven in the cause of ‘political stability’, as if it were just a playground scuffle.
Perpetrator communities respond in kind: “Why blame us?” Germans in the 1950s and 1960s pointed to the Allies’ firebombing of Dresden, the expulsions from eastern Europe and the mass rapes. Both sides can emerge more frustrated than satisfied, which breeds tension, visible in South Africa today. In Serbia, polling suggests most reject any primary responsibility for the wars. The trials haven’t eased that – and may have hardened it. As history lessons, they are a mixed bag at best, often counterproductive.
Polling suggests most Serbs reject any primary responsibility for the wars. The trials haven’t eased that – and may have hardened it
What do you think truth commissions or public inquiries can achieve that courtrooms cannot?
Again, the record is mixed, with South Africa being the notable case. But South America has had commissions, too, with or without trials. Both commissions and trials do well at establishing forensic truth, gathering documents and testimony in one place and publishing findings – work that would take historians decades. They have resources a lone historian lacks. They also attract public attention, prompting people to say: “I genuinely didn’t know.”
Yet there is no perfect response. Atrocity crimes hurt thousands, even millions, and are committed by institutions that may remain in power, so every solution has serious limits.
What I come back to is that sometimes you act because it is right, not because it solves a problem. You prosecute atrocities because they are evil, and prosecution is the proper response. Whether it brings stability, reconciliation or the ‘proper’ historical lessons doesn’t matter. These are bad people who did bad things, and they belong in jail.
- Read more | The Srebrenica massacre: the worst atrocity committed on European soil since the Second World War
What can these earlier trials tell us about the possibilities and limits of justice in the century ahead?
International justice has always been contentious as everyone wants enemies prosecuted, friends spared and themselves exempt. So, rejecting international tribunals isn’t new. But we are at an inflection point, because some major powers increasingly won’t even pay lip service to the principles of international justice.
Take the United States in Vietnam where the air war, plus massacres on the ground, were hugely controversial. The My Lai prosecutions [following the massacre of hundreds of Vietnamese civilians by US Army soldiers in March 1968] were half-baked, with acquittals and pardons. But some Americans at least had the decency to be embarrassed.
About a year ago, an adviser to President Trump gave an interview saying: “We live in a world, in the real world, that is governed by strength, that is governed by force, that is governed by power. These are the iron laws of the world since the beginning of time.” This reminds me of Thucydides’ observation that the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must. However Thucydides meant his words as a warning, not a model.
Those who reject the very possibility of justice have failed to learn that lesson. They are immoral and unwise.
Devin Pendas is professor of history at Boston College. He is the author of The Frankfurt Auschwitz Trial, 1963–1965: Genocide, History, and the Limits of the Law (Cambridge, 2006)
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This article was first published in the December 2026 issue of HistoryExtra Magazine
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