D-Day was one of the key episodes in the Second World War. But what did Winston Churchill make of the plans for the Allied invasion of Nazi-occupied France? Was, as some have suggested, the British prime minister really reluctant to get involved? And how fraught were relationships between the Allied leaders? Speaking to Matt Elton, Richard Dannatt and Allen Packwood, authors of new book Churchill's D-Day: The Inside Story, discuss the decisions and tensions behind the operation.

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What context do we need to understand about Churchill – and Britain – in the early years of the Second World War to make sense of what was to happen in the run up to D-Day?

Richard Dannatt: The first thing to consider is the circumstances of how Churchill became prime minister in May 1940. He had recently been present at a parliamentary debate to defend a disastrous campaign in Norway that had taken place in the months beforehand. It had been Churchill’s idea to try and hobble German industry by cutting off the supply of iron ore from Sweden through Norway into Germany – and it had been a disaster. Everything you can think of that could go wrong, had gone wrong – and it's one of the illustrated examples that we use in the British Army staff college about how not to conduct an operation. This – among other things – would continue to play on Churchill’s mind.

Allen Packwood: We must remember that Churchill is not elected prime minister in May 1940. He is there, really, because of a Westminster coup to remove Neville Chamberlain.

Churchill then had to construct a national coalition government, which meant he had to put together a war cabinet containing people who – until recently – had been his rivals or political opponents. This meant he did not enter the war as prime minister in a strong position – and he had to consider carefully how he was going to respond to that.

We then had the Dunkirk evacuation, and Churchill very famously said that wars are not won by evacuations. But it must have been very clear to him – in 1940 – that the road was going to be a very long, hard one before Britain could return to France.

One of the things that has often been said to have influenced Churchill’s approach to D-Day is his experience in the First World War, specifically the Dardanelles campaign (1915-16). Do you think this is overstated?

RD: I think the Dardanelles campaign had a major impact on Churchill. He was the Lord of the Admiralty at the time, and he had come up with the campaign’s concept, which was a bold attempt to try and break the deadlock of the extended trench warfare on the Western Front. You must give him marks for trying to find a new initiative, but – and this is the sadness – although the strategic thinking might have been reasonable, the operational delivery was woeful.

There was also a huge loss of life in the Dardanelles campaign. This, in addition to the Norway campaign, sat heavily on Churchill’s mind in the run up to D-Day. I think it played very much into his overall thinking.

AP: The lesson that he took away from Dardanelles was that if you were going to attempt an operation of this scale and complexity then you needed to do it very carefully – and at the right time. You needed to make sure that you had control of all the moving parts, politically and militarily.

We tend to think of Churchill as this bellicose war leader, but actually he was keen to avoid the huge losses of life that had occurred in the First World War

We tend to think of Churchill as this bellicose war leader, but actually he was keen to avoid the huge losses of life that had occurred in the First World War. This certainly influenced his strategy and thinking when it came to D-Day.

To what extent is it right to say that Churchill was sceptical of D-Day?

RD: Churchill knew at some stage that there needed to be re-entry into Europe, but he was very keen on it not being premature. So on the one hand, he was sceptical. But on the other hand, he knew it was inevitable. The big thing was to get the timing and preparation right.

AP: This idea of Churchill being sceptical about D-Day developed quite quickly after the end of the Second World War. Eisenhower, when he published his memoirs, described how at one of the big conferences in May 1944, just before D-Day, Churchill had told the gathering that he was hardening on this enterprise, which the Americans immediately took to mean that he had been soft on it up until that point.

This view has been taken up more recently in popular culture by the movie Churchill (2017). The film starts with Churchill walking on a British beach and recoiling as he has a vision of the sea running red with blood. The implication is that history is going to repeat itself; it’s going be the Dardanelles campaign all over again. The movie then proceeds to show Churchill attempt to obstruct the operation with 48 hours to go – which of course was not the case.

Churchill was also keenly aware of this idea that he was sceptical of D-Day – and he tried to respond to it in his own war memoirs. The key point is that he always knew we were going to have to go back into France, but he knew it should only be contemplated at the right moment when all the necessary preconditions have been met (so when we had the tactical experience, expertise, strategy and equipment required for what was going to be an incredibly difficult operation).

Do we know what Churchill felt about D-Day in the run up to the day itself?

RD: I think once Churchill had agreed in his own mind that it was going to happen, then he was determined that the operation should be given the best chance of success. He leveraged his convening power as prime minister to make sure that all these different elements were in place – from technical innovations… to planning… to even putting a lockdown in place in the south of England to maintain the security of the operation.

But we know that Churchill’s had doubts and fears about D-Day. Hence the remark to his wife, Clemmie, the night before, in which he mentioned the possibility of enormous casualties.

AP: Another of Churchill’s big concerns in the weeks running up to D-Day was the risk of French civilian casualties.

The bombing scheme that Eisenhower and the military commanders had settled on was one that targeted the French railway system and marshalling yards. These tended to be in areas of high civilian population density.

Churchill raised this issue multiple times with the defence committee and the war cabinet. He raised it with Eisenhower and President Roosevelt. His fear was that if the French take these very large casualties, then this might turn them against the Allies.

He was also thinking of the political ramifications of this course of action, which are that in the post -war world, this might drive a wedge between Britain and France. Ultimately, of course, he didn’t overrule the military commanders, but he did everything he could to try and limit the effect of that bombing on French civilians.

What did Churchill do on the day of 6th June?

AP: Churchill was in Downing Street in the Treasury Annex on the morning of D-Day, poring over the latest maps and charts and receiving the latest reports on what's happening on the beaches. At 12 noon, he moved to the House of Commons to make his first statement. At that point, there was not much he could say; the operation was still shrouded in the fog of war and it was not clear how it was developing. So Churchill left to have lunch with the king, and then visited some of the headquarters on the outskirts of London before coming back and reporting to parliament. The really interesting fact, of course, is that this was not where Churchill wanted to be at all – he wanted to be in the centre of the action itself and had tried unsuccessfully to get himself on board a British cruiser

What were the repercussions of D-Day? How did it affect Churchill's relationship with, for example, the US?

RD: Churchill began to realise – once the operations ashore were fully developed – that this was now the beginning of an inevitable switch from British influence to American influence. This meant that his ability to influence subsequent military strategy and higher-level operational objectives were no longer in his control. It was no longer solely a British operation. It was a realisation that the British position was changing and that the Americans position of supremacy was frankly becoming a reality.

Tim Benbow at King's College London has written that the D-Day landings showed Churchill at his best and at his worst. Is this a view that you have sympathy with?

AP: This is probably a view that I would have some sympathy with.

I think one of the things that Churchill did well – but isn’t often credited for – is the political work that he did behind the scenes in maintaining the national coalition. In the months before D-Day, he spent a lot of time preparing the country for this huge operation using the convening power of the prime minister to knock heads together, to ensure that production targets are met, to ensure that the artificial harbours needed for the operation are being built, to ensure that the right equipment and tanks are in place.

I suppose the worst of Churchill might be a certain sort of selfishness and stubbornness, which was certainly evidenced in his insistence that he wanted to accompany the troops across the channel, even though that was clearly not where he should be. I think he found the months leading up to D-Day personally very difficult because he was one of those people who liked to be at the centre of the action.

I think he also found it difficult to accept the transition to secondary status in the Anglo-American relationship.

How would you like people to understand D-Day and Churchill's role within it as we mark this anniversary?

RD: I think Churchill's role in D-Day illustrates most effectively Britain's role in D -Day and Britain's role in the new Europe that was created at the end of the Second World War. Let's face it, if D-Day had failed – and if we had not been able to defeat Nazi Germany and some kind of pact had been formed between Hitler's Nazi Germany and Stalin's Soviet Union – Europe would have looked a very different place today.

AP: For me, it's all about complexity and nuance. Too often when we talk about Churchill, we tend to just see that famous image of Churchill as the ‘bulldog warrior’ with his V for Victory salute and a cigar. We think of his speeches. But Churchill was an incredibly complex character; the decisions that he – and others – were taking were incredibly difficult and it's impossible to know if they got it right. In many of these decisions, there was not one right answer, just some incredibly tough choices.

But I think if you want to understand the world that we inhabit today – and the Europe that we inhabit today – then you must understand the decisions that underpin this and got us to where we are now.

Allen Packwood is director of the Churchill Archives Centre at Churchill College in Cambridge

Richard Dannatt is former Chief of the General Staff and member of the House of Lords

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This interview was taken from an episode of the HistoryExtra podcast: D-Day: was Churchill really against the operation?

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