One of medieval history’s biggest mysteries has just been solved – and it rewrites 1066
A fresh re-reading of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle suggests that King Harold Godwinson didn’t race south by land after Stamford Bridge, but instead used a coordinated naval strategy. What does that mean for how we should understand the events of 1066?

Alongside the Roman invasion of Britain in 43 AD, 1066 stands as one of the most pivotal years in British history. It marked the end of Anglo-Saxon rule and the ascendancy of the Normans under William the Conqueror.
At the centre of this story is King Harold Godwinson, the last Anglo-Saxon king. In the space of just a few weeks, he fought two major battles at opposite ends of England. In September, he defeated the Viking king Harald Hardrada at the battle of Stamford Bridge in Yorkshire. He is then said to have rushed south, covering some 200 miles to confront William, Duke of Normandy, who had landed on the Sussex coast to attempt to take the throne.
According to the traditional account, Harold and his army arrived exhausted – but just in time to fight at the battle of Hastings on 14 October, where he was killed.
This dramatic forced march has been used to explain both the pace of events, and Harold’s eventual defeat: his troops, worn out from the journey, were at a disadvantage against William’s forces.
But what if that version of the story is wrong?
New research now suggests that one of the most famous – and decisive – military marches in English history may never have happened at all.
A journey by land – or sea?
In new research, Professor Tom Licence of the University of East Anglia argues that Harold didn’t lead a desperate overland march from Yorkshire to Sussex. Instead, much of the journey south may have been made by sea.
The idea that the march itself may be implausible is not entirely new.
“There’s an argument going back to the that this great heroic march is almost impossible,” he says, speaking to HistoryExtra. He explains that even when compared with the most demanding marching rates recorded in modern warfare (for example, in the American Civil War) the speed required to cover the distance simply doesn’t hold up.
“To cover that distance in that period of time on foot is just unfeasible,” he says.
Crucial to Licence’s argument, he says, is the finding that the long-assumed march is “nowhere mentioned” in the contemporary sources – and is rather a post-hoc interpretation.
Previously, historians have offered explanations for this, saying that much of Harold’s army might have travelled on horseback, leaving slower troops behind. Partly, it’s interpretations such as this that have reinforced an image of Harold as a rash and desperate leader who rushed to confront William.
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But what has been largely overlooked, Licence argues, is a far more practical option: the use of ships.
Licence explains that his research centres on a reassessment of a key phrase in the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, one of the key historical sources that tells this story. A long-standing Victorian interpretation claims that Harold’s ships “came home,” which has been taken to mean that he disbanded his fleet before the battle of Hastings.
Licence argues this reading is mistaken.
“One of the key breakthroughs in my research is that when it says that he “sent the fleet home” it’s actually referring to London,” he explains. “On previous occasions it refers to the fleet going homeward to London … so if we read it that way, which I think we must, then we see that Harold still had use of his fleet. If you’ve got good weather and you’ve got ships in which you can move your troops, you move them by sea,” he says.
“That’s the pattern we see throughout the Chronicle.”
Not all historians are convinced that the traditional account should be set aside.
Stephen Morillo, emeritus professor of history at Wabash College, describes Licence’s argument as “an interesting theory, and certainly possible,” but has reservations.
Speaking to HistoryExtra about the research, he says that, in his view, the traditional account “is not just a Victorian invention.” He points instead to the 12th-century text The Chronicle of John of Worcester, written decades after 1066 that records that after Stamford Bridge, Harold, “at once, and in great haste, marched his army towards London,” before continuing south to face William.
He also notes that “none of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle versions says how Harold got south,” despite the source elsewhere not being “shy about noting sea transport when it happened.”

Harold’s coordinated campaign
Nevertheless, rather than a frantic dash across England, Licence’s research creates an image of a potentially far more organised and flexible campaign than was previously assumed.
Under appropriate conditions at sea, a journey from the Humber to London would have taken no more than four days – far quicker than the twelve or thirteen days required for even the most extreme forced march.
Adding to this, Licence says the scale of Harold’s available fleet may also have been greater than previously assumed, because the king might have added to his number of ships with those taken from the freshly defeated Harald Hardrada.
“The Chronicle says that the Vikings came with 300 ships and left in 24,” Licence points out. “No one has really asked what happened to the other 276.”
Licence isn’t suggesting that all of these ships would now have been at the disposal of the Anglo-Saxon fleet. But a large number might have been. And, if captured and repurposed, these vessels could have significantly expanded Harold’s naval capacity.

“This is a maritime world. Ships are power,” he says. “You cannot overcome an opponent, particularly a seaborne opponent, unless you have a fleet yourself.”
England in the 11th century was not a landlocked kingdom scrambling to respond, but a naval power whose fleet was “the talk of northern Europe.” Campaigns in Wales and Scotland in the years before 1066 consistently involved coordinated use of ships and land forces.
And the advantages of sea transport went beyond speed and logistics. When moving an army by sea, “you give them a chance to rest, and you contain them all,” Licence explains. “If they’re on the ships they can’t desert, which they can if they’re part of a large army on the march.”
Still, Licence doesn’t entirely rule out some movement by land or horseback; something that Morillo asserts would have been possible. Covering roughly 200 miles in twelve to thirteen days would require “a pace of sixteen to seventeen miles a day,” he says. “[That’s] well within the realm of possibility for a small force of around 5,000 men, most of whom would have been riding horses on campaign, as Anglo-Saxon thegns and certainly the housecarls always did, before dismounting to fight battles on foot.”
But, central to Licence’s research is the idea that if ships were available (and, he says, they were) then the main body of troops including Harold himself would have travelled by sea. “He wouldn’t have wasted twelve days marching when he could have got down to London in three days.”
Within this context, Licence says, Harold’s actions in the days leading up to Hastings begin to look much more strategic. “He is no longer this valiant but desperate character dashing south,” he argues. “He is a much more sophisticated operator, using forces by land and sea in tandem, like his opponents.”
This also paints Hastings as less predetermined, Licence says. “I think the battle could have gone either way. It could easily have been William who was killed that day.”
On this, Morillo agrees. He says the battle of Hastings was “a very near run thing, far from predetermined even on the day.” He concludes that what Licence’s research demonstrates for certain is that “there is always more to learn about the Hastings campaign and the battle itself.”
Rethinking the sources for 1066
Beyond changing the record on how Harold reached Hastings, the research also raises questions about how historians should interpret key sources, and challenge assumptions.
The Bayeux Tapestry, a vast embroidery depicting the events surrounding the Norman Conquest, has long been used alongside the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle to reconstruct 1066. But its selective narrative highlights the need to reassess familiar accounts.
Dr David Musgrove, content director at HistoryExtra and co-author of The Story of the Bayeux Tapestry, notes that the tapestry itself omits Harold’s northern campaign entirely.
“This discovery is particularly timely with the forthcoming arrival of the Bayeux Tapestry. It’s notable that the Tapestry completely ignores the fact that Harold fought a battle in the north before arriving to face Duke William in the south. The Tapestry’s narrative of the events of 1066 presents a very specific, and very partial account, of the conquest story. It focusses exclusively on southern England and northern France, and makes no reference at all to what happened in the north of England before the battle of Hastings.”
He concludes, “research like this from Professor Licence is vital in helping to fill in gaps.”
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Musgrove’s co-author, Professor Michael Lewis, curator of the Bayeux Tapestry exhibition at the British Museum, also relates the new research to the tapestry.
He says, “with the Bayeux Tapestry coming to the British Museum later this year, Professor Tom Licence's research shows there is much still to be learned about the events of 1066. Hopefully this new research inspires people to also come and see the Tapestry whilst it is in London.”
What the new research ultimately demonstrates is that the story of 1066 is far from settled.
And, with the Bayeux Tapestry set to go on display in Britain, this reassessment arrives at a moment when the events of 1066 are returning to the forefront of public attention, inviting a fresh look at one of history’s most iconic narratives.
Authors
James Osborne is a senior content producer at HistoryExtra

