To the Romans of the late 4th and 5th centuries AD, the threat posed by the Huns was akin to a nightmare made real.

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They were lightning fast, brutally violent, and as culturally unfamiliar as any people the Romans had ever encountered. They seemed to emerge suddenly from beyond the empire’s frontiers, bringing with them destruction and fear. Roman writers described them in vivid, unsettling terms, presenting them as the ultimate barbarians.

The arrival of the Huns on the frontier of the Roman empire coincided with a period historians often describe as the ‘Migration Period’ – a time of large-scale population movements across Europe, in which multiple groups were displaced and resettled, or otherwise pushed into Roman territory.

Yet for all the alarm they caused, the Huns didn’t want to destroy the Roman empire. They wanted to exploit it.

The reasons why reveal as much about Rome’s internal condition, as about the Huns themselves.

Who were the Huns?

The Huns were part of a broader pattern of migration and movement across Eurasia in late antiquity.

“They’re one of a series of non-Roman groups migrating, we assume, from Eastern Asia, possibly away from the Chinese Empire,” explains archaeologist Miles Russell, while discussing the life of Atilla the Hun on the HistoryExtra podcast.

Their precise origins remain debated, but many historians link them to steppe nomadic traditions that stretched across Central Asia, where highly mobile horse-based societies had long dominated.

Unlike settled agricultural societies based around static farming and protected settlements, they were very itinerant.

“They fight predominantly on horseback,” Russell says. This fighting style was a key factor in their military effectiveness. Their speed and flexibility made them difficult for Roman forces, accustomed to more structured warfare, to counter.

Hunnic warriors were particularly known for their use of composite bows, which could be fired accurately from horseback, allowing them to attack at range and retreat before heavier infantry could respond.

Importantly, however, Russell makes clear that the term ‘Huns’ doesn’t describe a single, uniform people.

“When we’re talking about the Hunnic empire, it’s a bit like talking about the Roman empire,” he explains. “Not everyone is from Rome; in the Hunnic Empire, not everyone is a Hun.”

Instead, the Huns functioned as a dominant elite – “the militaristic aristocratic force” – leading and coordinating a wider coalition of groups.

These included well-known names such as the Visigoths, Ostrogoths, Vandals and Burgundians. “These are different barbarian groups outside the Roman world,” Russell notes, “most from Europe or East Asia.”

Black-and-white illustration of Attila the Hun leading mounted warriors in a chaotic charge across a battlefield.
This dramatic 19th-century illustration portrays Attila the Hun and his forces in full charge, reflecting long-standing European depictions of the Huns as violent barbarians. This imagery reveals more about later historical attitudes and stereotypes than about the complex realities of late antique societies and the fall of the Western Roman Empire. (Photo by Getty Images)

A reputation built on fear

Roman knowledge of the Huns was limited and filtered through fear.

“The Romans are simultaneously terrified of the Huns, and they’re also really interested in them,” Russell says. Contemporary accounts describe their appearance and fighting style in detail but offer little reliable information about their origins or history. And, because “the Huns aren’t writing anything down themselves”, Roman observers were left to fill in the gaps.

In Roman literature, the Huns are portrayed as the antithesis of civilisation – people who didn’t farm, didn’t cook food in conventional ways, and lived in close physical proximity to their horses.

“They describe the Huns as cooking food by sticking it under their buttocks, heating it between rider and horse,” Russell says. They are also depicted as foraging for roots for their food, and living without settled communities.

Much of this imagery comes from writers such as Ammianus Marcellinus, whose accounts emphasised the difference and danger of the Huns, often exaggerating unfamiliar practices to reinforce notions of Roman cultural superiority.

Such claims are unlikely to be accurate. But they served a propagandistic purpose.

“To the Romans, the Huns represent the ultimate barbarian; the ultimate savage,” Russell explains.

These portrayals reinforced a long-standing Roman worldview that divided humanity into degrees of civilisation, with Rome at the centre and ‘savagery’ at the furthest extreme.

A coalition of peoples

A major strength of the Huns lay in their ability to mobilise and coordinate other groups beyond Rome’s borders. “They can galvanise lots of different barbarian groups together into an overwhelming military force,” Russell says.

This coalition approach made them particularly dangerous. Rather than a single army, they could draw on a wide network of allied or subordinate groups, adapting their forces as circumstances required.

At the same time, they stood apart from many of those groups culturally and politically.

“Most of the other barbarians … want to be Roman,” Russell explains. Groups such as the Visigoths and Ostrogoths often sought integration into the Roman world, including conversion to Christianity.

“The Huns don’t,” he says. “They make it clear from the beginning that they don’t want to be part of the Roman Empire.”

For many Germanic groups, entry into the Roman world meant land, status and wealth. But for the Huns, power came instead from exploiting those ideas.

Rome divided against itself

By the time the Huns appeared on the Roman frontier in the late 4th century, the empire itself was undergoing significant internal change.

“We mustn’t think of Rome at this stage as one empire, or even two halves of the same empire,” Russell says. “They are becoming two separate empires.”

This division had been formalised in 395 after the death of Emperor Theodosius I, when the empire was split between his sons into eastern and western administrations.

The eastern half, centred on Constantinople – a city founded in the 4th century and often described as “New Rome” – remained economically vibrant and politically stable.

“It’s successful, with strong trade links, a dynamic and exciting city,” Russell explains.

The western half, by contrast, was struggling.

“Rome in the west is more of a cultural backwater at this stage,” he says. Political authority was weakening, administrative systems were faltering, and emperors increasingly ruled from Ravenna in northern Italy rather than from Rome itself.

“Its military is collapsing,” Russell notes. At the same time, various non-Roman groups had already settled within its borders.

These included federate groups who were allowed to settle within the empire in exchange for military service – a system that increasingly blurred the line between Roman and non-Roman power.

Crucially, the two halves of the empire were not acting in concert. “East and west are not joining forces; they are competing against one another,” Russell explains.

At times, the two halves even came into conflict with each other.

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The Huns’ strategy

It was this fragmented, weakened Roman context that the Huns sought to exploit.

The Romans first became aware of the Huns indirectly, in the 370s AD, when other groups began fleeing westwards. This movement would eventually lead to major events such as the Gothic War and the battle of Adrianople in 378. But the Huns themselves soon followed.

“The first thing they do is send armies into the Eastern Empire, burning cities and saying, ‘give us money and we’ll go away,’” Russell explains.

It was a strategy of intimidation and extraction: not an attempt to replace Roman authority.

“They’d rather not destroy the Romans completely,” Russell says, “because they’re a useful group to blackmail and extort money from.”

Roman emperors often responded by paying large sums in tribute, effectively buying temporary peace. So, a functioning Roman state – wealthy and, at this moment, vulnerable – was far more valuable to the Huns than a conquered and destabilised territory.

Why Rome struggled to respond

In theory, Rome possessed the resources to respond effectively to such threats. In practice, it struggled.

“If Rome had been unified under a single command, if it had a decent military … it might have responded,” Russell suggests.

But those conditions didn’t exist.

Civil wars, political rivalries and internal fragmentation had weakened the empire’s military capacity. The division between east and west further complicated any coordinated response. A unified empire with a strong military and coherent leadership might have resisted them more effectively. Instead, the Huns encountered a declining Rome.

“It can’t deal with the Huns at any level,” Russell says.

This inability to respond decisively allowed the Huns to continue their strategy of pressure and negotiation, extracting wealth while avoiding the risks associated with full-scale conquest. This continuous aggression would, eventually, play a crucial role in the Western Roman empire’s slow collapse.

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Miles Russell was speaking to Spencer Mizen on the HistoryExtra podcast. Listen to the full conversation.

Authors

James OsborneSenior content producer

James Osborne is a senior content producer at HistoryExtra

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